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INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF ARTICLE
1

What is called “the nonprofit sector” includes a wide variety of
organizations whose diversity can be glimpsed, though not fully
appreciated, by the list of organizations that may be recognized by
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) as exempt from taxation
2
under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. This list includes
religious, health care, charitable, and similar organizations; social
welfare organizations; business leagues like a chamber of
commerce; social and recreation clubs, for example, a country
club; labor and agriculture organizations; fraternal beneficiary
societies or associations; and numerous other kinds of
3
As with any sector with myriad organizations,
organizations.
considerable further diversity would be apparent if the
organizations were grouped according to their budgets or revenues
and expenditures, their assets, number of paid employees, number
4
of volunteers, or amount of contributions or grants. According to
the Urban Institute, public charities, or ones exempt pursuant to §
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, “accounted for 63 percent
of registered nonprofits in 2008 and 59 percent of reporting
nonprofits,” grew sixty-one percent in number from 1998 to 2008,
and “reported $1.4 trillion in revenue and $2.6 trillion in assets in
5
2008.” A large number of these are “small charities.” Nearly
half—forty-five percent—reported annual expenses of less than
$100,000, and another 28.9% reported expenses between $100,000

1. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
2 (4th ed. 2010); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 23
(10th ed. 2011). The “nonprofit sector” is known by various other adjectives,
including “tax-exempt, voluntary, nongovernmental, [and] independent.” Id. at
24 (italics omitted).
2. Internal Revenue Code § 501(a) provides, “An organization described in
subsection (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this
subtitle unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.” I.R.C. §
501(a) (2006). Subsection (c) lists twenty-nine such organizations. Id. § 501(c).
3. Id.
4. See generally KENNARD T. WING ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 139–236
(2008) (exploring the size, scope, and finances of some nonprofit organizations).
The Urban Institute in Washington, D.C. conducts and publishes in-depth
research, including The Nonprofit Almanac 2008, analyzing and evaluating the
nonprofit sector.
Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, URBAN INST.,
http://www.urban.org/center/cnp/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
5. Kennard T. Wing et al., The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Public Charities, Giving,
and Volunteering, 2010, URBAN INST., at 2 (2010), http://www.urban.org
/UploadedPDF/412209-nonprof-public-charities.pdf.
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6

and $499,999.
The nonprofit sector has been characterized as “a growth
7
industry,” and in a similar vein, another authority writes that the
nonprofit sector and the federal tax law governing it “have a
8
Data
common feature: enormous and incessant growth.”
compiled by the IRS confirms such growth and indicates that as of
the end of 2009 the number of tax-exempt organizations and
9
nonexempt charitable trusts approached two million. That figure
does not include churches and other religious organizations
because they are not required to apply for recognition of tax
10
exemption or file annual returns, nor does it include any
organization claiming tax-exempt status that “normally does not
11
have more than $5,000 annually in gross receipts.” It would also
12
not include thousands, perhaps “hundreds of thousands,” of
unincorporated nonprofit associations, which may, but typically do
not, file a Form 1023 and seek recognition as a tax-exempt
6. Id. at 2–3.
7. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 12.
8. HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 23.
9. For the years 2006–2009, respectively, the IRS reported 1,726,491;
1,789,554; 1,855,067; and 1,912,695 tax-exempt organizations and nonexempt
charitable trusts. I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 55B, 2009 DATA
BOOK 56 (2009) [hereinafter IRS 2009 DATA BOOK], available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-soi/09databk.pdf. In June of 2011, the IRS revoked the tax
exemptions of 275,000 nonprofit organizations because they had not filed
required information returns for three consecutive years. See Stephanie Strom,
I.R.S. Ends Exemptions for 275,000 Nonprofits, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2011, at B3.
Approximately a quarter of these were recognized as tax-exempt prior to 1980,
and an analysis conducted by the Urban Institute concluded that “[w]hile it may
be tempting to attribute the failing of these organizations to the recession, it is
more likely that these organizations have been out of operation for many years.”
Amy S. Blackwood & Katie L. Roeger, Revoked: A Snapshot of Organizations That Lost
Their Tax-Exempt Status, URBAN INST., at 2 (Aug. 2011), http://www.urban.org
/url.cfm?ID=412386. A number of these nonprofit organizations, however, may
simply not have understood the obligation to file despite efforts by the IRS to
notify affected nonprofits. Strom, supra at B3. These organizations may reapply
for recognition as tax-exempt. Id. In any event, for now, the number of nonprofit
organizations was reduced accordingly. Id.
10. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(1)(i)–(ii)
(2010); I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 557, TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR
YOUR ORGANIZATION 22 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p557.pdf.
11. I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 557, TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR
YOUR ORGANIZATION 22 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p557.pdf; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(1)(iii).
12. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT, Prefatory Note
(2008) [hereinafter RUUNAA].
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organization.
Of particular interest, and the focus of this article, are those
nonprofit organizations that are recognized as tax-exempt under §
13
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. First, there is the sheer
number of such organizations and the growth that number
represents.
There are more than 1.2 million nonprofit
organizations that are exempt from taxation under this section,
14
representing growth by nearly half in the last decade.
Second is the nature of these organizations and the fact that
they are characterized by a public mission—religious, educational,
or charitable, with a focus on the community or the public—and
are not driven by the prospect or goal of personal financial profit.
That, of course, is the dominant, defining characteristic of the
nonprofit sector and particularly the 501(c)(3) nonprofit
15
organization—the “non-distribution constraint” that commands,
in the words of § 501(c)(3), that “no part of the net earnings . . .
[may inure] to the benefit of any private shareholder or
16
It is not that they cannot engage in business in
individual.”
furtherance of exempt purposes—they can—or that they cannot
13. Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) provides:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in,
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements),
any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate
for public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
14. According to the IRS 2009 Data Book, 1,238,201 of the 1,912,695
reported tax-exempt organizations and non-charitable trusts, or sixty-five percent,
were 501(c)(3) organizations. IRS 2009 Data Book, supra note 9, at 56; Giving USA
2011: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2010, GIVING USA FOUNDATION
19 (2011), http://www.givingusareports.org/products/GivingUSA_2011
_ExecSummary_Print.pdf (reporting that as of 2010 there were 1,280,739
501(c)(3) organizations, representing a forty-eight percent increase over the
865,096 such organizations in 2001). These numbers include private foundations.
15. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 497, 501–02, 595–96 (1981); Henry. B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838–40 (1980).
16. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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generate a “profit”—they often do. It is that they must serve “a
17
public rather than a private interest,” and “charity,” to give one
example of a qualifying purpose, is defined or interpreted very
broadly in a way that explicitly conveys the importance and value of
the work of these organizations to our society and to government at
18
all levels.
Third, organizations that are recognized as tax-exempt under
§ 501(c)(3) not only are not required to pay income and other
19
taxes, but donors to such organizations can receive a charitable
deduction from adjusted gross income on which they would
20
otherwise have to pay tax. While the favorable tax treatment of
501(c)(3) organizations can certainly be justified for the benefits
they offer, it is beyond clear that such treatment also comes at some
cost to society in the form of foregone tax revenues, and perhaps in
notions of fairness, which must necessarily underlie any tax system
21
expecting and entitled to public support, especially when there is
widespread concern over national budget deficits and the
economy. It is also true that there have been abuses and cases of
questionable conduct by those responsible for directing or
22
operating nonprofit organizations that have prompted extensive
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2011).
18. Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) provides, in part, that
the term “charity” includes:
Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement
of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or
maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the
burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by
organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to
lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or
(iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(2) (2011).
19. Ordinarily, but not always, an organization that is not required to pay
federal taxes will also receive an exemption at the state and local levels from the
obligation to pay state income, property, and sales taxes. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ,
supra note 1, at 440–45.
20. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
21. See, e.g., Editorial, It’s Time for Tax Law Changes for Nonprofits, DES MOINES
REG., July 25, 2011 (reporting avoidance of unrelated business income tax by the
Boys and Girls Clubs of America, decrying that “[n]onprofit hospitals are not
required by law to provide one penny of charity care or any defined amount of
‘community benefit,’” and asserting that “[e]ntities that do not want to pay taxes
should prove they are providing a public benefit that is worth the cost to everyone
else”).
22. Prominent cases in the 1990s involved United Way, Adelphi University,
and conversion or merger of nonprofit hospitals and health care providers to or
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analysis of the nonprofit sector and rethinking of the legal
23
requirements and expectations for exemption.
As a result, for several years now the IRS has emphasized good
governance. In a publication on the subject of governance and
24
related topics, it stated:
The IRS believes that a well-governed charity is more
likely to obey the tax laws, safeguard charitable assets, and
serve charitable interests than one with poor or lax
governance.
A charity that has clearly articulated
purposes that describe its mission, a knowledgeable and
committed governing body and management team, and
sound management practices is more likely to operate
effectively and consistent with tax law requirements. And
while the tax law generally does not mandate particular
management structures, operational policies, or
administrative practices, it is important that each charity
be thoughtful about the governance practices that are
most appropriate for that charity in assuring sound
operations and compliance with the tax law. As a measure
of our interest in this area, we ask about an organization’s
governance, both when it applies for tax-exempt status
and then annually as part of the information return that
many charities are required to file with the Internal
Revenue Service.
The IRS then proceeded to discuss the role of mission,
organizational documents, the governing body, governance and
management policies, financial statements and reporting on Form
into for-profit ventures. See Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in
Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (1993); Harvey J.
Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 633–35 (1998). For a recent
listing of reported instances of misconduct, see FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1,
at 6–12.
23. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., REPORT ON EXEMPT STATUS REFORM
(Discussion Draft 2004), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
/062204stfdis.pdf; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency,
Governance, Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Supplement to the Final Report
to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector, INDEP. SECTOR (Apr. 2006), http://www.
independentsector.org/panel_supplement_redirect; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector,
Strengthening Transparency, Governance, Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A
Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector, INDEP. SECTOR (June 2005),
http://www.independentsector.org/panel_final_report_redirect.
24. I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS –
501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege
/governance_practices.pdf.
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990, and transparency and accountability and their importance to
25
the requirements of § 501(c)(3). Though speaking in terms of
“governing boards” and mission and policies adopted by the “board
of directors,” the IRS disavowed a mandate for a particular
management structure.
Structure of course is a function of the choice of form of
organization that the organizers of a 501(c)(3) nonprofit make. In
fact, good governance practices may be and regularly are achieved,
and not achieved, in every management structure. What form to
choose? While the charitable trust form is an option and, for some,
the unincorporated nonprofit association may be a viable choice,
the “predominant” form of charitable organization in the United
26
States is the nonprofit corporation. Nonprofit corporation law,
like for-profit corporation law, is considerably more structured and
detailed than unincorporated entity statutes. For example, the
27
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (“MNCA”) deals with selection,
25. Id.
26. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 48–53. A well-drafted charitable
trust can accomplish much of what the corporate form would offer and is an
available choice, but unlike England, it has not been as popular as the nonprofit
corporation in the United States. Id.; see also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 200 cmts. c–d, at 5–7 (Council Draft No. 5, 2007). Organizers
of a 501(c)(3) nonprofit could choose to remain unincorporated, but if they later
sought recognition as a tax-exempt organization, the “association” would have to
elect to be taxed as a corporation and begin to observe formalities that
unincorporated associations can avoid. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 7701(a) (2006).
Moreover, at common law a number of problems beset the unincorporated
association. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
addressed some of these in the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association
Act (1996), adopted by twelve jurisdictions, and even more in the Revised Uniform
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008), which has been adopted so far
in four jurisdictions. RUUNAA (2008). For some organizations—particularly a
congregational faith for which incorporation and the mandate to have a board of
directors with statutory authority is ill-suited to their faith—an unincorporated
nonprofit association may be a viable and preferred choice. Sarah J. Hastings,
Cinderella’s New Dress: A Better Organizational Option for Churches and Other Small
Nonprofits, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 813, 816–17, 843–47 (2007). But many jurisdictions
have not adopted these Uniform Acts, and many uncertainties, obstacles, and
personal risks attend the choice of an unincorporated nonprofit association.
27. The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act was developed and approved by
the Committee on Nonprofit Corporations of the American Bar Association’s
Section on Business Law. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (2008) [hereinafter
MNCA]. The first edition was promulgated in 1952, and that in turn was revised
in 1987 and 2000 in the second edition. Throughout its development there has
been a consistent effort to track the Model Business Corporation Act where
possible and appropriate. See Lizabeth A. Moody, Foreword to MNCA, at xix–xxiv
(3d ed. 2008).
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28

resignation, and removal of directors, and their terms; meetings,
action without a meeting, call and notice of meeting, waiver of
29
notice, quorum, and voting; and officers’ duties, standards of
30
conduct, resignation, and removal in considerably more detail
than unincorporated entity statutes, if they deal with them at all.
Many of these provisions have come to be enabling provisions,
subject to individual nonprofit organizations’ choices in their
articles and bylaws, but as in all corporate law the prevailing wind
is regulatory and mandatory unless permission otherwise is granted
in the statute. Moreover, other than provisions that enable or
permit choice or variation, there is not the freedom to create and
describe the organization and its processes in a way, for example,
that unincorporated entity law presumes.
In contrast to the corporation, in the business world the
limited liability company, or LLC, has become the predominant
choice of form in which to organize a business, and many more
31
LLCs are being formed today than corporations. The reasons for
that are commonly understood and widely appreciated. The LLC
provides its members with the limited liability shield of a
32
corporation and the flow-through or conduit taxation for a
33
partnership that means there is no tax at the entity level.
28. MNCA § 8.04–.05, .07–.09.
29. Id. § 8.20–.24.
30. Id. § 8.41–.43.
31. The 2010 Annual Report of the Delaware Division of Corporations
discloses that there were nearly three times the number of LLCs formed compared
to corporations for the years 2008 (81,923 versus 29,501), 2009 (70,274 versus
24,955), and 2010 (82,027 versus 28,181). See DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT (2010), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/10CorpAR.pdf; Harry J.
Haynsworth, The Unified Business Organizations Code: The Next Generation, 29 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 83, 85 n.25 (2004) (stating that in 2002 in Wisconsin there were 18,132
LLCs formed, compared to 5,752 corporations). The experience in Iowa in 2009
was similar, with 8,569 LLCs being formed compared to 2,734 corporations.
Annual Report of Iowa, INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS (2009), http://gavinm
.com.c25.sitepreviewer.com/iaca/?country=USA&state=IA&section=BOS&print=tr
ue&year=2009. See generally Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill:
An Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LLPs Formed in the
United States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006,
15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459 (2010).
32. E.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 304 cmt. (2006) [hereinafter
RULLCA].
33. Under federal tax regulations popularly known as “check-the-box,” a
single member LLC is a “disregarded entity,” while a multi-member LLC is
presumed to be a partnership, resulting, in both cases, in no tax being imposed on
or assessed to the LLC as an entity. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(i) (2011);
I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 8832, ENTITY CLASSIFICATION ELECTION,
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Moreover, LLC acts observe the characteristic right of
unincorporated business associations that one chooses one’s coowners and, while economic rights are freely transferable, the
transfer carries with it no management or information rights to the
34
transferee. Significantly, LLC acts invariably represent “default”
legislation allowing parties to create their arrangement and
describe their deal as they want, stating explicitly that the Act
governs only “[t]o the extent the operating agreement does not
otherwise provide,” and providing further only a minimum number
35
of provisions that cannot be varied.
The question arises whether the limited liability company is
available as a form in which to organize a nonprofit organization,
and specifically, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit. It might be appropriate
36
particularly for smaller charities, where flexibility contemplated
by LLC legislation might reduce the burden and expense of
observing formalities and allow those running the nonprofit to
focus on mission and goals. But is this form that was developed in
the business context to shield private owners from personal liability
and minimize taxes on earnings distributable to owners available in
or sensible for the nonprofit world? Does the LLC offer the
structure or assurance of “a well-governed charity” that nonprofit
law and the IRS require? These questions implicate the purposes
for which an LLC may be formed, the manner in which it is
managed, the non-distribution constraint and control of assets,
fiduciary duties, and the enforcement of fiduciary duties and
37
This article turns to an
protection of charitable assets.
examination of these issues.
II. THE LLC IN THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONAL WORLD:
USE AND CONDITIONS
In truth, the limited liability company is being used in the
nonprofit organizational world and has been for many years. First,
in certain carefully prescribed circumstances, a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit can enter into a joint venture in the form of an LLC with
a for-profit entity and not lose its exemption. In Revenue Ruling
CAT. NO. 22598R (2011) [hereinafter
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf.
34. See RULLCA §§ 501–502.
35. See id. § 110(b)–(c).
36. See Wing et al., supra note 5, at 2–3.
37. See infra Part III.
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98-15, the IRS determined that a charitable nonprofit organization
could enter into a joint venture in the form of a limited liability
company with a for-profit organization, without forfeiting its taxexempt status and ability to receive charitable contributions,
provided that its participation was properly structured to further its
38
exempt purposes. In its Revenue Ruling, the IRS described two
situations, in one of which the exemption was preserved, while in
39
In the former situation a nonprofit
the other it was lost.
operating an acute care hospital contributed all of its assets to a
newly formed LLC that was going to be operated by the for-profit
40
entity, which also contributed assets. The ownership interests of
the two were proportional to their contributions; the articles of
organization and operating agreement provided for a governing
board consisting of three individuals chosen from the community
by the 501(c)(3) nonprofit hospital and two selected by the forprofit entity; the articles and operating agreement also required
the board to operate the LLC in a manner furthering the
charitable purposes of the nonprofit; and distributions were
41
None of the nonprofit’s
proportional to ownership interests.
officers, directors, or key employees involved in the decision or
planning was promised any employment or inducement or had any
42
personal financial interest in the LLC. The nonprofit charitable
health care mission would be fulfilled by the LLC, and it would
utilize distributions it received to make grants “to support
education and research and give resources to help provide health
43
On these facts the IRS held that the
care to the indigent.”
nonprofit would continue to qualify as a 501(c)(3) organization
when it formed the LLC with the for-profit entity. A similar result
may be achieved in a joint venture taking the form of an LLC
where the joint venture activity is “ancillary” to the nonprofit’s
primary operations but an insubstantial part of its total operations;
38. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718 [hereinafter Rev. Rul. 98-15]. These joint
ventures are discussed and analyzed thoroughly in several leading sources. See
CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND
BUSINESS LAW ¶ 1.09 (1994 & Supp. 2011-1); HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 30.3; see also
Robert R. Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations: For Profits, Nonprofits, and
Hybrids, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 553, 563 (2009).
39. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, supra note 38 (providing two situations to show when a
nonprofit organization would or would not lose its tax exemption).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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where attention is similarly paid to exempt purposes, structure, and
control over assets and operations; and where there is assurance of
44
proportionality in distributions.
Second, 501(c)(3) nonprofits regularly employ the device of a
single member limited liability company to form a subsidiary that
will hold property or operations that carry risk. Imagine a
nonprofit that owns and operates a number of nursing homes and
care facilities in communities across the state. Each carries
predictable risks. These risks can be isolated in one or more
nonprofit LLC “subsidiaries,” and the parent nonprofit shielded
from liability. Or a donor may be prepared to contribute valuable
real property to a nonprofit, but there is a risk of environmental
claims. The nonprofit can form an LLC to receive and hold the
property, thus shielding itself from liability, but may report the
property as an asset of its own on informational returns required by
45
the IRS. For purposes of tax-exemption, under the “check-the46
box” regulations, the LLC formed by the nonprofit would be a
47
“disregarded entity.” As such, it would not have to file a new or
separate Form 1023 to apply for recognition as a tax-exempt
organization, and the IRS would look to the organization and
operation of the parent to assure itself of compliance with relevant
laws and regulations.
Third, and with reference to the specific issue under
consideration of whether the limited liability company form can be
or is being used as the structure for a 501(c)(3) nonprofit
44. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974; see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note
38, ¶ 1.09[2][c][iii]; HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 30.4, at 928–30.
45. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200134025 (Aug. 24, 2001).
46. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-3(c)(1) (2011); I.R.S. FORM 8832, supra note 33.
47. See I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY REFERENCE GUIDE SHEET 1 (2011) [hereinafter GUIDE SHEET
INSTRUCTIONS], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/llc_guide_sheet
_instructions.pdf (“A domestic LLC with a single owner is disregarded for federal
tax purposes unless it elects to be regarded separately from its member, in which
case it is treated as an association that is taxable as a corporation. A disregarded
LLC whose sole owner is exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a) of
the Code is not required to pay federal taxes or file a federal tax or information
return; that is the responsibility of its sole owner. See Announcement 99-102[,]
1999-43 I.R.B. 545. The disregarded entity receives the benefit of its owner’s taxexempt status, including exemption from federal income tax, federal
unemployment tax, and other federal taxes where applicable. A disregarded
entity may also choose to report and pay employment tax for its employees. See
Notice 99-6, 1999-3 I.R.B. 12. Nevertheless, the sole owner is generally protected
against potential liabilities that may arise, under state law, from the activities of its
disregarded entity.”).
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organization, the IRS has determined that two or more tax-exempt
organizations can organize an LLC in which they will be members
and the LLC will qualify as tax-exempt in its own right, provided
48
that twelve conditions are satisfied. However, the authorization is
limited to 501(c)(3) nonprofits as the organizers and the IRS does
not authorize individuals or non-501(c)(3)s to utilize the LLC to
49
form a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization.
It is instructive to look at the twelve conditions in the context
of the requirements stated in § 501(c)(3) and the IRS’s emphasis
on good governance policies and practices. They are:
1. Do the organizational documents (e.g., Articles of
Organization, Operating Agreement, comparable
organizational documents (or their equivalents))
include a specific statement limiting the LLC to one
or more exempt purposes?
2. Do the organizational documents specify that the LLC
is operated exclusively to further the exempt
purpose(s) of its members?
3. Does the organizational language require that the
LLC’s members be limited to section 501(c)(3)
organizations, governmental units, or wholly owned
instrumentalities of a state or political subdivision
thereof?
4. Does the organizational language prohibit any direct
48. This position and these conditions were revealed in the IRS’s continuing
professional education regarding exempt organizations. RICHARD A. MCCRAY &
WARD L. THOMAS, I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
AS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS—UPDATE 29–32, available at http://www.irs.gov
/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb01.pdf. The IRS has published a reference guide sheet
stating these conditions and providing instructions. See I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY REFERENCE GUIDE SHEET (2011) [hereinafter
GUIDE SHEET], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/llc_guide_sheet.pdf
(“This Reference Guide Sheet is designed to help process: (1) requests for
information on the treatment, under federal tax law, of limited liability companies
associated with tax-exempt organizations, and (2) IRC 501(c)(3) exemption
applications filed by limited liability companies.”). A joint venture between two
nonprofit entities in the form of a limited liability company was one of the
situations that the Drafting Committee for the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act (1994) had in mind when committee members decided to allow an
LLC to be formed for any lawful purpose, whether or not for profit. See infra note
68.
49. GUIDE SHEET INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 47, at 3 (“An LLC applying for
exemption under section 501(c)(3) cannot have any members that are individuals
or are organizations other than 501(c)(3) organizations or governmental units or
instrumentalities.”).
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or indirect transfer of any membership interest in the
LLC to a transferee other than a section 501(c)(3)
organization or governmental unit or instrumentality?
5. Does the organizational language state that the LLC’s
assets may only be transferred (whether directly or
indirectly) to any nonmember, other than a section
501(c)(3) organization or governmental unit or
instrumentality, in exchange for fair market value?
6. Does the organizational language provide that upon
dissolution of the LLC, the LLC’s assets will continue
to be devoted to tax-exempt purposes?
7. Does the organizational language require that any
amendments to the LLC’s articles of organization and
operating agreement be consistent with section
501(c)(3)?
8. Does the organizational language prohibit the LLC
from merging with, or converting into, an entity that
is not exempt under section 501(c)(3)?
9. Does the organizational language prohibit the LLC
from distributing any assets, other than in exchange
for fair market value, to members who have ceased to
be either organizations described in section 501(c)(3)
or governmental units or instrumentalities?
10. Does the organizational language include an
acceptable contingency plan in the event one or more
members of the LLC ceases at any time to be an
organization described in section 501(c)(3) or a
governmental unit or instrumentality?
11. Does the organizational language state that the LLC’s
tax-exempt members will expeditiously and vigorously
enforce all of their rights in the LLC and pursue all
legal and equitable remedies to protect their interests
in the LLC?
12. Does the LLC represent, in a separate written
statement, that all of its organizing document
provisions are consistent with state LLC laws, and are
50
enforceable at law and in equity?
It is apparent that these provisions are intended to provide
assurance that the requirements of § 501(c)(3) are satisfied,
50.

GUIDE SHEET, supra note 48.
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perhaps some more than others. The first, second, sixth, and
seventh conditions reflect and incorporate standard provisions to
include in a nonprofit corporation’s articles to assure that the
nonprofit is organized and will be operated exclusively for exempt
purposes and that charitable assets will remain dedicated to the
public or charitable purpose, as § 501(c)(3) and accompanying
51
regulations command. The fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and
tenth conditions are clearly intended to ensure that “no part of the
net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
52
Actually, the
individual,” as explicitly required by § 501(c)(3).
eleventh condition serves this same purpose. In requiring the
organizational documents to state or demonstrate that “the LLC’s
tax-exempt members will expeditiously and vigorously enforce all
of their rights in the LLC and pursue all legal and equitable
remedies to protect their interests in the LLC,” the condition
reflects the IRS’s concern over personal inurement and private
benefit, excessive compensation, and conflict of interest
53
transactions. Obligations and duties that attend to members and
management under applicable law will count for little if they are
not faithfully observed and “expeditiously and vigorously”
enforced, so the eleventh condition is in reality another expression
of the IRS’s emphasis on good governance practices.
The third condition is of a different order—a means to an
end—that enables the IRS to look to nonprofit members’ own
articles of organization and bylaws, at the risk of revocation of the
members’ tax-exempt status, to be assured of the LLC’s satisfaction
of the organizational and operational tests, among others. But it
also means that individuals who could form a nonprofit
corporation and constitute its board of directors cannot instead
organize a limited liability company, provide for it to be managermanaged perhaps, appoint themselves managers, and undertake to
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)–(c) (2011).
52. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); GUIDE SHEET, supra note 48.
53. See, e.g., GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS,
supra note 24, at 2–4 (“The organization should regularly and consistently monitor
and enforce compliance with the conflict of interest policy.”); I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY, FORM 1023, APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION, CAT. NO.
17133K (2006) [hereinafter I.R.S. FORM 1023], available at http://www.irs.gov
/pub/irs-pdf/f1023.pdf (including a sample conflict of interest policy); I.R.S., U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME
TAX, CAT. NO. 11282Y (2010) [hereinafter I.R.S. FORM 990], available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf (asking whether the reporting nonprofit has a
conflict of interest policy).
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comply with the law and regulations regarding 501(c)(3) nonprofit
organizations. The problem they face, however, is less the IRS’s
refusal to extend the limited liability company to individuals and
non-501(c)(3) organizations wanting to form a nonprofit, than it is
54
state law and the rights of “members” of LLCs in earnings,
55
56
management, and assets. LLCs grew up in a business context,
freeing members from a corporate structure and double taxation
and letting them proceed as partners would, but with a limited
liability shield for members and the ability through contract to
structure their deal as they want, free of the mandates and
regulatory culture which attends corporate practice, even with the
trend towards “enabling” provisions authorizing corporations to
vary many corporate norms. The key word in the third condition is
“members,” a term with clear and familiar legal significance under
state laws authorizing the formation of limited liability companies.
Of course, members in their articles and operating agreement may
include the necessary statements and provisions that a 501(c)(3)
organization’s documents must contain, but what will prevent
amendment—the seventh condition—and what will ensure
enforcement of a nonprofit governing board’s obligations and
responsibilities—the eleventh condition? That, presumably, is the
point of the twelfth condition: “Does the LLC represent, in a
separate written statement, that all of its organizing document
provisions are consistent with state LLC laws, and are enforceable
57
This twelfth condition—focusing on the
in law and equity?”
enforceability of provisions in the organizing documents—is
especially understandable given the state of limited liability
company law in 2001 when the IRS published its Reference Guide
Sheet.
III. ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE LLC LAWS AFFECTING THE
AVAILABILITY OF AN LLC FOR USE AS A 501(C)(3) NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATION
There have been developments in LLC law since 2001,
however, and perhaps it is time to reevaluate the IRS’s position. In
2003 the Uniform Laws Commission undertook a revision of the
54. E.g., RULLCA § 404 (2006); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-503 to -504 (2011).
55. E.g., RULLCA § 407; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402.
56. E.g., RULLCA § 708; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804.
57. GUIDE SHEET, supra note 48, at 2.
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1996 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and in 2006 it
58
promulgated the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act.
59
It has been enacted in six jurisdictions, introduced in others, and
60
is being studied in still more. Quite apart from the Uniform Act,
61
three states have adopted nonprofit LLC legislation, and a fourth
specifically included in its LLC statute language providing for a
nonprofit LLC and explicitly incorporating relevant sections of the
state’s nonprofit corporation act so that they apply as well to
62
LLCs. Other states have amended their LLC statutes. Together
these may address concerns the IRS has expressed about the
limited liability company as an allowable form for a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit organization where its organizers are not themselves
501(c)(3) organizations.
This part of the article examines
significant state law issues that have to be addressed if an LLC can
serve as a vehicle for nonprofit activity more broadly than currently
authorized by the IRS.
A. Is the Operation of a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit a Proper Purpose for an
LLC?
At about the time the IRS was making known and later
publishing the twelve conditions on the use of limited liability
63
companies as exempt organizations, the authors of a leading
treatise on LLC law and taxation stated, “All enabling statutes
require that a limited liability company have a business purpose. A
64
limited liability company may not be a not-for-profit enterprise.”
58. RULLCA, Prefatory Note.
59. The District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming.
D.C. CODE §§ 29-1001–1075 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6 (2011); IOWA CODE
ANN. Ch. 489 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29 (2011).
60. See, e.g., Memorandum from Ron Wargo, Chair, Bus. Law Section, State
Bar of Cal., to Office of Governmental Affairs (June 1, 2010), http://
www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=zu68OHm6zHI%3D&tabid=2796
(seeking to adopt RULLCA under California law).
61. Kentucky, North Dakota, and Tennessee. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN §
275.520–540 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-36-01 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48249-309 (2011).
62. The fourth state is Minnesota. See MINN. STAT. § 322.B (2011).
63. GUIDE SHEET, supra note 48, at 1–2.
64. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES:
TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 5.03 (1994 & Supp. 2002) (footnotes omitted). The
authors based this conclusion on some statutes directly requiring a business
purpose and other statutes implying a for-profit purpose on account of statutory
provisions for distribution of profits. They added, “It would make no sense to
allow a limited liability company to function as a not-for-profit organization. A
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While the view that all LLC enabling statutes require a business
purpose undoubtedly was accurate at the time, LLC legislation in
65
several states has changed since that time. For example, Delaware
authorizes a limited liability company to “carry on any lawful
business, purpose or activity, whether or not for profit, with the
66
exception of the business of banking” ; the 1996 Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act—enacted in eight states—provided that a
limited liability company could be organized “for any lawful
67
purpose” and specifically defined “business” to include “every
trade, occupation, profession, and other lawful purpose, whether
68
or not carried on for profit” ; and the Revised Uniform Limited
limited liability company exists to have partnership tax status, and not-for-profit
entities are subject to an entirely different regime.” Id. at n.59. Later editions of
Bishop & Kleinberger take note of the changes in the text while continuing to
conclude that an LLC is much better suited for a for-profit business enterprise
than a nonprofit tax-exempt organization. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note
38, ¶ 5.03[1]. For another author who reaches the same conclusion, see MATTHEW
DORÉ, IOWA BUSINESS LAW AND PRACTICE 283, 295, 295 n.12 (2010).
65. See infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
66. Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 6, § 18106(a) (2011).
67. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 104 (1996). The eight states that have adopted
the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act are Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois,
Montana, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia; the Virgin
Islands have also adopted the Act. Id. at References & Annots.
68. Id. § 101(3). Colorado law is to the same effect. An LLC may be
organized “for any lawful business” purpose; and, “business” is defined as “any
lawful activity.” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-102(3), -103 (2011). Whether
organizers should be able to form a limited liability company for nonprofit
purposes was raised and discussed at both the 1993 and 1994 Annual Meetings of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
In 1993, on the morning the proposed Uniform Act was first being read, the
Chair of the Drafting Committee, Florida Uniform Law Commissioner Edward I.
Cutler, said, “And may I comment, this [section 112 of the Act] is where you find
the answer, that the act is designed to deal with even non-businesses, as well as
nonprofit enterprises.” Transcript of the Twelfth Session of the 1993 Annual
Meeting of the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 38 (Aug. 5,
1993) (on file with author). Commissioner Carl H. Lisman of Vermont rose
immediately to comment on this position, stating, “It seems to me that the
committee ought to give serious reconsideration to its decision to sweep into the
jurisdiction of this act nonprofits and non-businesses.” Id. Commissioner Lisman
went on to say that in contrast to the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act and the
Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations Act, “there are lots of provisions
in this act that are inappropriate for non [sic] for profit entities.” Id. He declined
to make sense of the house motion at the 1993 Annual Meeting, but he said he
would revisit the issue at the next Annual Meeting if the Drafting Committee’s
position remained the same. Speaking to Commissioner Lisman, Drafting
Committee member Commissioner Howard Swibel of Illinois explained:
We are basically putting it out there for one reason, which is to elicit
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response from effected [sic] parties. There are, for example, a lot of
joint ventures now between not for profit corporations which could be
facilitated by the use of this kind of device. We are looking for input
from affected parties on this issue.
Id. Commissioner Lisman adhered to his position. If the joint venture was “profit
motive oriented,” he believed the Act should cover them; and “[i]f they’re not
profit motive oriented, it doesn’t matter to me whether the constituent members
are for profits or non-profits. They shouldn’t be covered by this act. They’re not
tax driven. They’re not limited liability driven in the sense that a for-profit
organization is.” Id. at 38–39. The issue was taken under advisement for
consideration by the Drafting Committee and reported to the Conference in 1994.
In 1994 the issue of whether organizers of a nonprofit organization could
utilize a limited liability company formed under the Uniform Act was identified as
a significant policy issue for the Conference at its Annual Meeting. Vermont
Commissioner Carl Lisman rose again to address the issue:
I don’t want to let the issue pass again. This is the first meaningful
section that deals with whether or not a limited liability company is going
to also be allowed to usurp the field of non-profit entities. There are a
number of provisions in this act that deal with the formation and
conduct and termination and so forth of a limited liability company that
make absolutely no sense in the context of non-profits. The committee
has acknowledged that it is an issue that they have not fully resolved. It
arises on Line 6 on Page 24 in the phrase ‘for any lawful purpose.’
Maybe it ought to be ‘for any lawful for-profit purpose or any lawful
business purpose.’ Rather than—this is not a new issue—rather than
force the issue at this time, I call it to the attention of the floor. It will be
raised as we get further on, when we get into more substantive sections.
Transcript of the Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co.
Act, 1994 Annual Meeting of the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State
Laws 51–52 (July 29, 1994) (on file with author). Committee Chair Edward I.
Cutler responded that Commissioner Lisman’s comments “com[e] from the
chairman of the Unincorporated [Nonprofit] Association Committee of this
conference, and it’s a well taken point.” Id. He went on to explain that the
inclusion of nonprofit organizations within the scope of the LLC Act was a
position urged by Millard Ruud, Uniform Law Commissioner from Texas and
National Conference Reporter for the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit
Associations Act, who was not on the floor at the time. Commissioner Cutler said:
I would like him to explain it, whereby we will put cautionary remarks in
the comment that will disclose the problems to anyone who wants to
organize a limited liability company for non-profit purposes, or include a
non-profit entity as a member of a limited liability company, the various
points you have in mind. We thought it would be throwing the baby out
with the bath water if we did not permit certain kinds of non-profit
organizations to be allowed to use the limited liability company format.
Id. at 52–53. Commissioner Lisman observed that Commissioner Ruud had not
thought the issue would arise until the afternoon, “which is why I think in part we
want to defer further discussion of the issue.” Id. at 53.
The issue was raised at the end of the day. Recognized by the Chair of the
Committee of the Whole, Commissioner Lisman stated, “The consensus is to let
the matter ride and let you do it in a comment.” Id. at 241. Commissioner
Matthew S. Rae, Jr., of California, disagreed with this position. “I see no reason
why there should be a not for profit entity that would be a limited liability
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Liability Company Act (“RULLCA”) similarly provides that an LLC
69
“may have any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for profit.” If
profit, or even business, need not be the purpose of the LLC,
70
individuals can readily draw on the LLC to hold title to property,
71
which may not represent a “business” in common parlance but
72
nevertheless can be advantageous to business and estate planning.
But does “any lawful purpose” or “regardless of whether for
profit” mean that these statutes contemplate and authorize
formation of a nonprofit organization that could qualify as a
501(c)(3) nonprofit? Certainly it should be clear that the language
regarding permissible purposes is broad enough to encompass the
exempt purposes articulated in § 501(c)(3), and it should not be a
sufficient objection to the use of an LLC for a charitable nonprofit
enterprise that it is inconsistent with state law because it lacks a “for
73
profit,” “business” purpose. If we take the case of RULLCA, is that
company. It seems that we’re doing this simply for tax purposes.” Id. at 242.
Accordingly, he moved “that the act be limited to for profit businesses.” Id.
Drafting Committee Chair Cutler stated again that tax reasons were not the only
reasons for forming an LLC, that “problems with tax or anything else” would be
dealt with in an Official Comment to section 112, and that “the consensus is that
we have good reason to let them do it if they can.” Id. ABA Adviser Robert
Keatinge noted that the issue “has been discussed fairly extensively around the
country and certainly around the drafting table on this act.” Id. at 243. “Many of
the concerns that have been validly raised are concerns that relate not to whether
an entity is organized for profit or not,” he said, “but whether an entity is tax
exempt.” Id. It was his opinion, and he thought that of the members of the
Drafting Committee as well, “that’s something that is best left to the Internal
Revenue Code.” Id. Commissioner Rae’s motion did not pass. Id. at 244.
The Official Comment to section 112 of the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act (1994) reads in full:
“Business.” A limited liability company may be organized to engage in an
activity either for or not for profit. The extent to which contributions to
a nonprofit company may be deductible for Federal income tax purposes
is determined by federal law. Other state law determines the extent of
exemptions from state and local income and property taxes.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 112 cmt. (1994).
69. RULLCA § 104(b) (2006).
70. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 38, ¶ 5.03[1].
71. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act defines “business” to include “every
trade, occupation, and profession,” and the section on partnership formation
provides that the holding of property jointly does not give rise to a presumption of
partnership formation, “even if the co-owners share profits made by the use of the
property.” REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 101(1), 202(c)(1) (1997).
72. In drafting committee meetings for RULLCA, the example of a family
owning a cabin or lakeshore property through an LLC was a frequent example of
the utility of RULLCA’s language “regardless of whether for profit.”
73. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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what the Drafting Committee or the Conference intended? The
answer to that question is less than clear. One of the goals of the
drafting committee was to expand the availability and advantages of
74
the LLC as a form of organization. But again, does that mean
that a limited liability company formed under the planned, revised
uniform act was intended to be available to organize a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit? The prospect was noted and discussed at the first
meeting of the Uniform Law Commissioners to consider a
75
proposed Revised Act, and the preliminary and ultimate position
of the Drafting Committee was to leave crucial protective provisions
to other law, but to envision and authorize an LLC without a forprofit purpose.
76
As indicated earlier, some states have adopted nonprofit LLC
legislation. Tennessee, for example, adopted the Nonprofit
77
Limited Liability Company Act of 2001. What the statute did was
to authorize a nonprofit tax-exempt corporation to organize an
LLC as the sole member, thus assuring that the LLC was a
74. Transcript of Annual Meeting of Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif.
State Laws 5 (Aug. 6, 2003) (listing the remarks of Commissioner and Chair, David
S. Walker). One example of a permissible use of an LLC under a revised,
expanded Uniform Act was a residential cooperative. Id. at 6–8 (providing the
remarks of Commissioner Hiroshi Sakai, ABA Advisor Robert R. Keatinge, and
Commissioner Harry Haynsworth).
75. Id. at 5 (listing the remarks of Commissioner and Chair David S. Walker);
id. at 8 (listing the remarks of Commissioner William R. Breetz, Jr.).
Commissioner Walker represented that the Drafting Committee’s position “is that
we should leave [provisions in state laws addressing the role of the state in
ensuring that property given for charitable purposes continues to serve those
charitable purposes] to other [state] law rather than to build into this statute on
limited liability companies protections of that charitable purpose.” Id. at 5.
Commissioner Breetz noted that broadening the Act to include charitable
nonprofits would invite a “heightened level of scrutiny by the IRS at the whole
form of ownership, because they would be obliged in making an analysis under an
application for 501-C-3 tax exemption as to whether this LLC has as its purpose
primarily a nonprofit purpose or a for-profit purpose.” Id. at 9. He noted the
interest that “substantial institutions like universities and hospitals” would have,
and he commented further that:
[T]here are just tens of thousands of little, tiny nonprofit groups all over
the country who are using the Nonprofit Corporation Act as their sole
means of doing business, and there are some considerable historical
differences between the two forms that you’re going to have to
contemplate, I think, in your drafting process. Methods of control, for
example. Minimum number of directorships that are part of the model
act.
Id.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 66–69.
77. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-701 to -708 (2011).
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“disregarded entity for federal income tax purposes” and serving
78
the parent’s purposes as described above. Kentucky legislation,
adopted in 2006, amends the state’s LLC Act to include a nonprofit
79
limited liability company, allows a nonprofit limited liability
80
company to be formed for a nonprofit purpose, and references,
in the definition of “nonprofit purpose,” the purposes clause of
81
Minnesota also provides
Kentucky’s nonprofit corporation act.
explicitly for a nonprofit limited liability company, disavows that
formation under its legislation is “determinative of its tax
treatment,” and expressly includes protective provisions of the sort
82
And in 2009, North Dakota
that RULLCA left to other law.
enacted its Nonprofit Limited Liability Company Act similarly
expressly authorizing a limited liability company to be formed for a
nonprofit purpose, incorporating by reference protective
provisions found in the nonprofit corporation statute, and
disavowing that formation under the Act is determinative of federal
83
tax treatment.
What is clear under these statutes and also, in truth, under
statutes like RULLCA, is that assumptions about the “purpose” of
an LLC are not a persuasive or acceptable basis for preventing
individuals or non-501(c)(3) organizations from forming a
nonprofit limited liability company that merits consideration for
recognition as a tax-exempt organization. There must be another
reason, other than most common usage—which is clearly forprofit—or notions of inherent purpose based on the widespread
popularity of the LLC for federal tax purposes under a regime
entirely different from the one governing nonprofit organizations,
to preclude an LLC from being organized as a nonprofit and
qualifying for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3).

78. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
79. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.005 (2011). The Secretary of State’s Office in
Kentucky reports that 303 nonprofit limited liability companies have been formed
under this statute. E-mail from J. Allen Eskridge, III, Ky. Assistant Sec’y of State, to
author (Aug. 12, 2011) (on file with author).
80. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.015(18) (2011).
81. Id. §§ 275.015(19), 273.167.
82. MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.03, subdiv. 31a, 322B.975 (2011).
83. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-36-01 to -09 (2011).
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B. Is the “Management Structure” of an LLC Inappropriate for a
Nonprofit LLC?
While neither § 501(c)(3) nor the IRS in its policies prescribes
a particular management structure, the IRS plainly expects much
of management, both in the initial showing through the completed
Form 1023 and in the annual informational reports, such as Form
84
“Regardless of whether a charity is a trust, corporation,
990.
unincorporated association, or other type of organization, it must
have organizational documents that provide the framework for its
85
governance and management.” There must be some “governing
board,” and the governing board is encouraged (1) to establish,
adopt, regularly review, and popularize a mission statement; (2) to
become and remain “active and engaged” in governance and
compliance; (3) to adopt governance and management policies,
especially concerning executive compensation, conflicts of interest,
investments, fundraising, record keeping, document retention and
destruction, and ethics and whistleblowing; (4) to ensure proper
preparation of and review financial statements and Form 990 and
“ensure that [the charity] abides by the requirements of state law”
and federal law; and (5) to be committed to transparency and
86
accountability to constituents. The emphatic importance of good
nonprofit governance to the IRS is not in doubt by any means. Any
number of cases, regulations, rulings, required forms like Form
990, and more communicate that point clearly.
But there should be nothing about the management structure
envisioned by state LLC acts to prevent practices along the lines
described above from being adopted by those managing the
limited liability company. It is true that one of the attractive
features of the limited liability company under state laws is the
flexibility that members have to create and tailor the management
structure in a way that for them will be most effective in ensuring
the successful pursuit of goals and conduct of the LLC’s affairs.
Those creating the LLC may choose to have it be “membermanaged,” in which the members have equal or whatever
negotiated voice in the management of the ordinary affairs of the
company, or they may choose to be “manager-managed,” elect
84. See supra text accompanying note 53.
85. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, supra note
24, at 2.
86. Id. at 2–8.
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managers from their number, and have the managers manage the
87
company as a “board of managers” or even a “board of directors.”
Or they may allocate authority among them, drawing on particular
88
In any of these cases, those responsible for
strengths of each.
managing a nonprofit LLC seeking tax-exemption under §
501(c)(3) may vigorously follow the counsel of the IRS briefly
described above and provide the good, sound governance the Code
and the IRS expect and demand.
To be sure, some structure is required by § 501(c)(3) and
implementing regulations, for the very terms of the Code require
that the nonprofit be a “[c]orporation[, or] any community chest,
89
There must be an entity apart from
fund, or foundation.”
individuals organized and operated exclusively as a charity; the
notion of “organization” requires agreement and “a regulatory
90
framework of government or mode of operation.” An LLC is an
entity apart from its members, however, and LLC legislation clearly
contemplates organization and management structure. It is an
unincorporated entity, but an unincorporated nonprofit
association may secure recognition from the IRS as a tax-exempt
organization if it has organic rules or articles of organization and
its documents contain provisions committing the association to
91
compliance with § 501(c)(3)’s requirements.
In short, the management structures open to an LLC should
not present a problem in qualifying as a tax-exempt nonprofit
organization. As a practical matter, it might be advisable to elect to
be manager-managed and to constitute the managers as a “board of
managers,” “board of governors,” or “board of directors” as the
92
Indeed, in
Minnesota and North Dakota LLC Acts envision.
93
Revenue Ruling 98-15 discussed earlier, in which the IRS held
87. RULLCA § 407 (2006).
88. Id. §§ 110, 407; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-401 to -404 (2011).
89. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
90. Trippe v. Comm’r, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 622 (1950); see 4 Internal Revenue
Manual-Admin. (CCH) pt. 7751, § 321.4, at 20,556 (Apr. 28, 1977) (stating
forcefully, “[a] formless aggregation of individuals without some organizing
instrument, governing rules, and regularly chosen officers would not be a
[‘corporation, community chest, fund, or foundation’] for purposes of §
501(c)(3),” and, thus, would not be a tax exempt charitable entity).
91. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 49; see also I.R.S. FORM 1023, supra
note 53; see supra Parts II (Question 3), III.
92. MINN. STAT. § 322B.03, subdivs. 7–8 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-36-03
(2011).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 38–44.
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that a 501(c)(3) nonprofit that entered into a joint venture in the
form of an LLC with a for-profit entity would continue to qualify as
a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization, the co-venturers forming the
LLC created a “governing board.” Thus, it would probably be good
sense for the nonprofit LLC to be manager-managed and have a
“board of managers.” Given the operational necessities for larger
charities—appointment and evaluation of officers, setting executive
compensation, preparation and review of budgets and financial
statements, assurance of compliance with applicable law, including
federal tax law, to give some examples—a governing board would,
as a practical matter, seem essential to the decision making and
oversight that would be required to qualify for § 501(c)(3) status
and that would be required under state law. But a “board”
structure should not be essential. If it were member-managed, the
members would be the managers. Legally, there is no prescribed
94
size for a board, just an expectation that it be effective, and
depending on the number of members, the members might
function like a board. While a more formal, corporate-like board
structure would be advisable for larger charities, for smaller
95
charities—of which there are many —it is imaginable that there
would be few organizers or governors and that the membermanaged structure would be preferable and no less effective than a
formal board structure.
Structure implies composition and operation, and each of
these subjects is undeniably of crucial importance to qualification
as a tax-exempt, nonprofit organization under § 501(c)(3). With
respect to composition, the IRS expects the board to include
independent members who will represent the public interest and
advises that a “very small” governing board “may not adequately
96
serve the needs of the organization.” Moreover, the IRS looks to
94. MNCA section 8.03 does require a minimum of three directors, but there
is no equivalent provision in limited liability company acts. MNCA § 8.03 (2008).
LLC legislation pointedly does not prescribe a “manager-managed” structure, but
instead leaves management structure to the members to determine. RULLCA §
407(a) (2006). LLC legislation also does not prescribe a minimum number of
either managers or members beyond the necessity that there be at least one
member to constitute an LLC. See, e.g., id. § 201(a), (d)–(e) (stating that the
limited liability company is formed only when it has “at least one member”).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 5–6.
96. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, supra note
24, at 2 (“Small boards run the risk of not representing a sufficiently broad public
interest and of lacking the required skills and other resources required to
effectively govern the organization.”). The IRS has often emphasized the
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disinterested and independent directors to ensure that there are
no insider transactions that could result in misuse of charitable
assets, including excessive compensation that would run afoul of
the proscription on private inurement and constitute an excess
97
benefit transaction. The position taken and advice given by the
IRS reflect its emphasis on good governance as a vital means to
ensure compliance with the tax laws and regulations. Essentially
the IRS is concerned about conflict of interest transactions. Such
transactions may be beneficial to the nonprofit organization, but
they may also result in private inurement or private benefit. The
IRS expects to avoid the latter result through good governance and
compliance with state law.
That requires the presence of
independent directors or “managers” to whom full disclosure of all
material facts must be made and who, before they will approve a
proposed transaction, will fully inform themselves about the
transaction and scrutinize it to ensure that it is in the best interests
of the organization. Nonprofit corporate law provides a procedure
that addresses conflicting interest transactions and requires a
process that includes full disclosure to and approval by
98
“disinterested directors.” LLC legislation similarly does so, albeit
99
in a more abbreviated fashion. Any charitable nonprofit—large
or small, in corporate form or, if available, in the form of an LLC—
would have to ensure that it was not violating the private inurement
and private benefit proscriptions of § 501(c)(3) or authorizing an
excess benefit transaction; the form of the entity, however, is not
material to whether disinterested and independent persons are
included in the management. It may be that a nonprofit limited
liability company might be more attractive to a “smaller charity”
than a nonprofit corporation because of its fewer mandates and
reduced expectation of formality—i.e., its greater flexibility. For
smaller charities it might be more difficult to obtain disinterested
persons to serve on a governing board and fulfill expectations
under both state law and federal tax law. But in either case the
nature of the entity itself does not ensure or preclude its doing so.
Structure also implies operation of the governing board. As
importance of the board of a charitable nonprofit organization being drawn from
the community and representing the public. E.g., Rev. Rul. 98-15; Rev. Rul. 69545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
97. I.R.C. § 4958 (Supp. 2010); GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3)
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 24, at 3.
98. E.g., MNCA § 8.60.
99. E.g., RULLCA §§ 110(e), 409(b)(2), (e), (f) (2006).
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mentioned above and as is widely known, the limited liability
company frees those managing it and conducting its business and
affairs from the detailed prescriptions and required formalities that
are common in nonprofit corporation acts, mirroring as they often
do for-profit corporate legislation.
LLCs are significantly
100
Matters of procedure in an LLC are
“creature[s] of contract.”
generally left to the parties to deal with through the operating
101
The operating agreement may be “oral, in a record,
agreement.
102
Courts may give lesser
implied, or in any combination” of these.
weight to formalities in a small limited liability company where
formalities clearly are not observed and may choose not to
103
disregard the LLC as an entity separate from the members;
corporate law, for-profit or nonprofit, is different. Questions like
whether directors can participate electronically or over the
telephone in a board meeting; whether directors can vote by email;
whether directors can take action without a meeting; and whether
directors can vote by proxy, to give some examples—none of which
are addressed in the typical limited liability company act—are dealt
with in nonprofit corporate legislation, or if not, present serious
104
questions.
The informality and flexibility which a limited liability
company may take advantage of, including charities, particularly
small charities, if they were permitted to form a nonprofit LLC,
100. RULLCA § 110 cmt.; Daniel S. Kleinberger & Carter. G. Bishop, The Next
Generation: The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 515, 545
(2007).
101. RULLCA § 110(a).
102. Id. § 102(13).
103. RULLCA § 304(b); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101 (2011); see, e.g., D. R.
Horton, Inc.-N.J. v. Dynstar Dev., LLC, 2005 WL 1939778 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
Aug. 10, 2005).
104. MNCA § 8.20 (2008). The act authorizes a director “to participate in a
regular or special meeting by, or conduct the meeting through the use of, any
means of communication by which all directors participating may simultaneously
hear each other during the meeting” and provides that “[a] director participating
in a meeting by this means is considered to be present in person at the meeting.”
Id. Section 8.24 addresses voting by directors, but is silent on voting by e-mail and
does not authorize directors to vote by proxy. Id. § 8.24. Unless the articles
require that action be taken at a meeting, directors may take action without a
meeting “if each director signs a consent in the form of a record describing the
action to be taken and delivers it to the nonprofit corporation.” Id. § 8.21. Several
of the questions mentioned were discussed recently on the listserv of the
Nonprofit Organizations Committee of the ABA’s Business Law Section. See
Postings of Members of the Nonprofit Orgs. Comm. of the A.B.A. Bus. Law
Section, bl-nonprofit@mail.americanbar.org (on file with author).
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would necessarily be limited by the requirements imposed on them
by § 501(c)(3) as interpreted and applied by the IRS. A 501(c)(3)
nonprofit must actually be operated for and also be able to demonstrate
105
For
or prove such operation in furtherance of its exempt purposes.
the IRS, formalities matter and are expected to be observed. For
example, minutes of meetings should be taken and preserved so
that there is contemporaneous documentation of meetings and
106
Minutes can
action taken by written consent without a meeting.
provide useful evidence of the directors staying informed,
exercising due care in decision making and oversight, and dealing
appropriately with conflicts of interest, executive compensation,
107
Minutes and record keeping can document
and similar matters.
that a decision was made and due consideration given to it so that a
court will defer to the directors’ or governors’ judgment. And if
the question were to arise, observance of formalities can help to
avoid disregard of the nonprofit entity. For the IRS, preparation
and keeping records is evidence of the good governance it believes
is more likely to secure, if not essential to, compliance with federal
tax and other laws. Thus, on Form 990 the IRS requires a
nonprofit organization that is obligated to file to answer the
questions: “Did the organization contemporaneously document the
meetings held or written actions undertaken during the year by the
following: (a) The governing body; (b) Each committee with
108
The IRS’s
authority to act on behalf of the governing body?”
requirement in this regard has been criticized as impractical and
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a), (c) (2011); I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, PUB NO. 4221-NC, COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
(OTHER THAN 501(C)(3) PUBLIC CHARITIES AND PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS) 14 (2010),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221nc.pdf (“In general, a taxexempt organization must maintain books and records to show that it complies
with tax rules.”); GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS,
supra note 24, at 5–6.
106. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, supra note
24, at 5.
107. David M. Bardsley, Composition and Operation of the Board of Directors, in
NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 103, 111 (Victor Futter et al. eds.,
2002); GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 36 (George W.
Overton & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d ed. 2002); LISA A. RUNQUIST, THE
ABCS OF NONPROFITS 80–82 (2005).
108. I.R.S. FORM 990, supra note 53, at Part VI (Questions 8a–8b); see also James
J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, 29
VA. TAX REV. 545, 568 (2010) (“All organizations that file Form 990 must complete
the section, Part VI, that requests information regarding an organization’s
governing body and management, its governance policies, and disclosure
practices.”).
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unnecessarily burdensome for medium-size and smaller charities,
but the requirement remains. Accordingly, some of the hoped-for
flexibility and informality that an LLC would offer to a small charity
might in certain respects be unavailable or unwise as a practical
matter.
Whatever the burden of preparing minutes and other records,
it would not be less if the nonprofit were in the form of a nonprofit
corporation rather than an LLC. Either way the nonprofit must be
able to show that it is complying with the requirements of the tax
laws, and Form 990 does not depend on the nature of the entity in
110
Nothing inherent in the structure, possible
this regard.
composition of its management or governing board, or manner of
operation of an LLC precludes recognition of it by the IRS as a taxexempt entity if other obstacles do not appear and cannot be
addressed. The IRS would, in any event, look to the duties or
responsibilities of the managers or governing body to ensure
compliance and continued qualification for treatment under §
111
501(c)(3). That is the very nature of its emphasis on governance
in the nonprofit sector. The important questions would be the
responsibilities or fiduciary duties of the managers, to whom they
are owed, and whether and how they are fulfilled and enforced.
Let us turn first to the subject of fiduciary duties.
C. Fiduciary Duties and Responsibilities of LLC Management
In focusing on nonprofit governance, the IRS is recognizing
and underscoring the fiduciary duties and responsibilities of the
governing board or managers of a qualifying nonprofit. Prevention
of unreasonable compensation, excess benefits, and conflict of
interest transactions, for example, rests on fulfillment of the
managers’ duty of loyalty “to act in the interest of the charity rather
than in the personal interest of the director or some other person
or organization” and “to avoid conflicts of interest that are

109. James J. Fishman, The IRS’ Corporate Governance Initiative: Recommendations
for Medium and Smaller Nonprofits, in ADVISING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 299, 332–
35 (2009). Professor Fishman characterizes the IRS’s requirement for minutes of
every meeting as “documentation run amok” and comments, “[s]maller
organizations often conduct committee meetings informally. It can become a
burdensome commitment of staff time to take and prepare minutes of all actions
taken, particularly at the committee level.” Id. at 332–33.
110. See I.R.S. FORM 990, supra note 53, at Part VI (Questions 8a–8b).
111. See infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
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112

detrimental to the charity.”
The instructions to Form 1023
include a sample conflict of interest policy, and Form 990 asks
directly about the existence, substance, and enforcement of a
113
Selection, monitoring, and evaluation
conflict of interest policy.
of executives; determination of reasonable compensation;
establishment of a budget and review of financial statements; taking
care to ensure that forms and returns are accurately completed and
timely filed and that the nonprofit is otherwise in compliance with
the requirements of § 501(c)(3); oversight of fundraising and
investments to ensure compliance with federal and state law;
adoption of proper policies and procedures; preparation and
retention of records; and “setting ethical standards and ensuring
114
they permeate the organization and inform its practices” —all of
these require an informed, attentive, and diligent board exercising
good judgment on behalf of the nonprofit and with only its best
interest in mind. In short, they assume a duty of care and duty of
loyalty that those responsible for governing the nonprofit will
fulfill.
Are there differences between the fiduciary duties applicable
to limited liability companies and the fiduciary duties owed by
directors of nonprofit corporations or charitable trusts? Nonprofit
corporate law imposes on directors both a duty of loyalty and a duty
115
“Each member of the board of directors, when
of care.
discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and
(2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best
112. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, supra note
24, at 3–5.
113. I.R.S. FORM 990, supra note 53, at Part VI (Questions 12a–12c); I.R.S.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1023, APPENDIX A (2006), available at I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1023, APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF
EXEMPTION, CAT. NO. 17132Z, app. A at 25–26 (2006) [hereinafter I.R.S.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1023], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023
.pdf. The IRS does not in terms require adoption of a conflict of interest policy;
but the existence or nonexistence of such a policy is taken into account by the IRS
in determining whether to recognize an organization as tax-exempt, and
Appendix A to the Instructions for Form 1023 contains a sample conflict of
interest policy that the IRS recommends be adopted. I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FORM 1023.
114. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, supra note
24, at 2–7 (providing examples that are illustrated in text accompanying note
114).
115. Under RUUNAA, the members of an unincorporated nonprofit
association select managers, and the managers are also subject to duties of loyalty
and care. RUUNAA § 23 (2008). Section 22 provides that if the members do not
select managers, the members are the managers. Id. § 22.
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116

interests of the nonprofit corporation.”
The duty of loyalty is
conveyed through the obligation to act “in the best interests of the
nonprofit corporation.” Conflict of interest transactions are
117
addressed directly in the statute, and a separate provision offers a
statutory safe harbor to a director presenting a business
opportunity first to the disinterested directors, with full disclosure
118
Much of the law
of material facts, who decline the opportunity.
articulating and applying the duty of loyalty in the corporate
119
context is case law. The standard of care quoted above is not the
same as the standard of liability. That is shaped by, among other
120
things, the business judgment rule and is dealt with separately.
The business judgment rule—which may be “more appropriately
121
known in the nonprofit context as the best judgment rule” —
provides a presumption that the director exercised due care in
making a decision in the absence of the plaintiff showing that the
director was not disinterested or was not informed to the extent the
director could reasonably have believed appropriate in the
122
As a result, it has been held in an influential
circumstances.
116. MNCA § 8.30(a) (2008); see also, e.g., A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. §§ 300, 310, 315 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (discussing
governing-board members’ fiduciary duties, duty of loyalty, and duty of care). See
generally GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 107,
at 17–42 (discussing the duties and rights of nonprofit corporation directors,
including the duty of care and duty of loyalty); David B. Rigney, Duties and Potential
Liabilities of Officers and Directors of Nonprofit Organizations, in NONPROFIT
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 83–102 (Victor Futter ed., 2002) (summarizing the
duties of nonprofit organization directors and officers and analyzing standards of
performance and potential liabilities).
117. MNCA § 8.60. In addition, section 8.32(a) provides that “[a] nonprofit
corporation may not lend money to or guarantee the obligation of a director or
officer of the corporation.” Id. § 8.32(a).
118. Id. § 8.70.
119. E.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses &
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974) (involving transactions with
conflicting interests and discussing both duty of care and duty of loyalty); Mile-OMo Fishing Club, Inc. v. Noble, 210 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (analyzing
competition with the nonprofit corporation); Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris,
661 A.2d 1146 (Me. 1995) (exploring usurpation of nonprofit corporate
opportunity).
120. MNCA § 8.31 cmt. This approach follows provisions in the Model
Business Corporation Act. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984).
121. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 152–53.
122. The business judgment rule has been recognized and expressed by the
American Law Institute. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1992). The ALI adds a third prong, namely that
the director must “rationally believe[] that the business judgment is in the best
interests of the corporation.” Id. § 4.01(c)(3). In section 365 of Principles of the
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opinion that in order for a director of a nonprofit corporation to
be found liable for breach of the duty of care, the director must
“have committed ‘gross negligence’ or otherwise be guilty of more
123
In contrast, the trustee of a
than mere mistakes of judgment.”
charitable trust has been found to breach the trustee’s duty of care
124
According to one
for negligence alone, not gross negligence.
leading authority, however, there has been a convergence of
standards, and the corporate fiduciary standards are coming to be
applied to both trustees of charitable trusts and directors of
125
nonprofit corporations.
Those responsible for managing a limited liability company
similarly owe duties of care and loyalty. Courts have applied
common law fiduciary standards and analogized to closely held
corporations in defining the fiduciary duties applicable to members
126
or managers of an LLC. Some states that have adopted nonprofit
limited liability company legislation have made provisions of their
nonprofit corporation law stating directors’ duties applicable to
127
A number of jurisdictions have adopted
nonprofit LLCs.
128
RULLCA, which recognizes and defines a duty of loyalty and a
Law of Nonprofit Organizations, the ALI is presently articulating the business
judgment rule in substantially the same terms. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 116, § 365.
123. Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1013.
124. E.g., Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 92 (Ct. App.
1970); In re Estate of Donner, 626 N.E.2d 922, 927 (N.Y. 1993).
125. The American Law Institute is thus not presently distinguishing between
the duties of loyalty and care owed by nonprofit corporate directors and charitable
trustees or other governors of nonprofit organizations. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 26, §§ 310, 315. Elsewhere it explained that the
Principles would deal with the consequences of differences between the forms of
charity on an issue-by-issue basis.
Among the most important potential differences between charitable
trusts and nonprofit charitable corporations are fiduciary standards and
consequences for breach; settlor and donor control versus decisional
autonomy for the governing board; and supervisory regimes. In these
three important areas, however, trust and corporate law have been
conforming, with the general result that corporate fiduciary standards of
conduct are being applied to both trustees of charitable trusts and
members of a nonprofit corporate board . . . .
Id. § 200 cmt. b.
126. Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp. 2d 890, 898–900 (N.D.
Ind. 2002); Purcell v. S. Hills Invs., LLC, 847 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006);
Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 815 (Mass. 2009).
127. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 322B.975, subdiv. 5(a) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1036-03(1) (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. 48-101-705(a) (2011).
128. RULLCA § 409(b)(1)–(3) (2006).
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129

duty of care.
The provisions of RULLCA dealing with the duties
of loyalty and care are substantially the same as those applicable to
130
Misappropriation of LLC property or
nonprofit corporations.
opportunities, a conflicting interest transaction, and competition
with the LLC during the conduct or winding up of its affairs are
actions that would violate the duty of loyalty, and the standard for
liability for breach of the duty of care is essentially one of gross
131
negligence.
Any differences between the fiduciary duties of directors of
nonprofit corporations and the duties of managers of limited
liability companies, therefore, seem negligible in terms of the good
governance expectations of the IRS for governing boards of taxexempt charitable nonprofits. What may be of more concern is the
ability of members of limited liability companies to tailor—that is,
to alter, abridge, or even eliminate—the fiduciary duties owed by
LLC management to the LLC and to one another. Reflecting the
nature of the LLC as a “creature of contract,” this ability has been
one of the widely perceived benefits of selecting the limited liability
company form. RULLCA allows members to alter fiduciary duties
129. Id. § 409(c).
130. See GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note
116, at 19–20, 29 (discussing nonprofit corporation directors’ duties of loyalty and
care); see also MNCA § 8.30 (2008) (covering the standards of conduct for
nonprofit corporation directors).
131. RULLCA § 409(c) states the duty of care in terms similar to the
formulation provided in sections 8.30 and 8.31 of the Model Business Corporation
Act, but makes the duty “[s]ubject to the business judgment rule.” RULLCA §
409(c) (2006); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30-.31 (1984). The intended
effect of that language was to recognize a gross negligence standard where, within
a state that would adopt RULLCA, that would be the effect of applying the
business judgment rule. E.g., Smith v. VanGorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985),
overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del.
2009). That is the position taken in the Stern case. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l
Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
At the Uniform Laws Commission 2011 Annual Meeting, the Commission
approved an updated version of RULLCA harmonized with the the Commission’s
other unincorporated business entity acts that revises section 409 of RULLCA and
explicitly adopts the standard of “refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or
reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.” See
RULLCA § 409; UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408(c) (2001); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §
404(c) (1997); Uniform Laws Commission Wraps Up 120th Annual Meeting, UNIF. LAW
COMM’N (July 13, 2011), http://www.nccusl.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=Uniform
%20Law%20Commission%20Wraps%20Up%20120th%20Annual%20Meeting.
That is the standard of care provided in section 404(c) of the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act and section 408(c) of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. UNIF.
LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408(c); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(c).
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132

in the operating agreement, subject only to a stringently defined
test of manifest unreasonableness and the contractual obligation of
133
The Delaware Limited Liability
good faith and fair dealing.
Company Act allows members not only to restrict fiduciary duties
but also to eliminate them altogether, though they may not
eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair
134
It is not clear that this can be done in the case of a
dealing.
135
However, there is authority that holds
nonprofit corporation.
that, subject to limits, fiduciary duties of the governing board of a
136
Doing so, however, is
nonprofit organization may be modified.
expressly made “subject to limits,” and it seems unlikely that a
nonprofit limited liability company applying for recognition as a
tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organization would reduce applicable
fiduciary duties without very good cause. Possibly, a nonprofit
might do so in order to attract to the governing board
uncompensated volunteers who would provide independent and
137
138
disinterested expertise and perspective. Federal and state law
132. RULLCA § 110.
133. Id. §§ 110(h), 409(d).
134. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2011).
135. There is nothing in Model Nonprofit Corporation Act sections discussing
directors’ duties giving any indication that the duties imposed by those sections
may be modified, reduced, or eliminated. See MNCA §§ 8.30–.31.
136. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 116, § 305.
Section 305 provides:
Fiduciary duties may be modified by or as permitted in the organizational
documents, except that no modification may—
(a) Reduce the duty of loyalty provided in § 310 in a manner that is
manifestly unreasonable, taking into account the charitable nature of the
organization.
(b) Reduce the duty of care provided in § 315 so as to permit a knowing
violation of law, intentional misconduct, reckless conduct, or gross
negligence.
(c) Absolve a fiduciary from the obligation to act in good faith.
Id.
137. The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–14505 (Supp.
2009), provides volunteers with protection from liability to third parties “related to
[their] serving nonprofit organizations and governmental entities,” and it
preempts inconsistent state law except to the extent the state provides additional
protection from liability relating to volunteers. Id. § 14501(b). With some
exceptions, the Act states that “no volunteer of a nonprofit organization or
governmental entity shall be liable for harm caused by an act or omission of the
volunteer on behalf of the organization or entity” if (1) the volunteer was acting
within the scope of the volunteer’s responsibilities at the time of the act or
omission, (2) the volunteer was properly licensed, certified, or authorized for the
activities or practice if appropriate or required, (3) “the harm was not caused by
willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4

660

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:2

typically provide volunteers, including directors, with immunity
from personal liability except in stated circumstances, and state law
also allows an organization through its articles to limit or eliminate
monetary liability for any action or failure to act, again with certain
exceptions. In consequence, reduction of the fiduciary duties of
members of the governing board of charitable nonprofit
organizations—as could be done under many states’ LLC laws and
certainly RULLCA—should not be necessary. Moreover, any
reduction of the standards for the duty of care or duty of loyalty
would surely draw close scrutiny from the IRS in evaluating the
completed Form 1023, and a nonprofit LLC would be unlikely to
do so without clear and persuasive justification. The authority that
those organizing an LLC have to modify the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty, therefore, should not present problems that cannot
be addressed or avoided.
There is still another duty that should be mentioned.
Directors of a nonprofit corporation are said to owe a duty of
obedience to the organization to carry out its purposes as
expressed in the articles of organization or certificate of
139
incorporation and ensure that the organization “operates to
further its stated objectives in compliance with applicable legal
140
According to one court, the “duty of obedience”
requirements.”
conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by
the volunteer,” and (4) the harm was not caused by the volunteer operating a
motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other vehicle for which the State required the
operator or owner to possess a license or to maintain insurance. Id. §
14503(a)(1)–(3). The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, however, does not
address or affect the responsibility of volunteers to a nonprofit organization or
governmental entity under applicable State law: “Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect any civil action brought by any nonprofit organization or any
governmental entity against any volunteer of such organization or entity.” Id. §§
14501–14505.
138. At the option of the nonprofit organization, state nonprofit corporation
law typically does provide directors and officers with a shield from personal
liability for monetary damages for breach of their duties to the corporation and its
members, but subject to exceptions for conflict of interest transactions, breach of
the duty of loyalty, acts or omissions not in good faith involving intentional
misconduct or knowing violation of law, and unlawful distributions. E.g., MNCA §
2.02(b)(8), (c) (2008); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(5) (2002).
According to one authority, “Approximately one-half of the states protect all
uncompensated volunteers regardless of their position.” FISHMAN & SCHWARZ,
supra note 1 (citing Jill R. Horwitz & Joseph Mead, Letting Good Deeds Go
Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws and Tort Deterrence, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
535 (2009)). Iowa Code section 613.19 is an example of such a statute.
139. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 199–202.
140. Rigney, supra note 116, at 83, 87. The authors of Nonprofit Law and
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requires directors “to ensure that the mission of the charitable
corporation is carried out” and to “be faithful to the purposes and
141
goals of the organization.” Not all agree that a duty of obedience
142
exists, and in the developing Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
Organizations the American Law Institute (“ALI”) declines to
143
The ALI
recognize it except as a part of the duty of loyalty.
explains that while the governing board “must adhere to the
organizational documents,” the board has an obligation “to keep
the purpose of the charity current and useful,” which may require
144
amendment.
Regardless of whether there is a duty of obedience, the duty of
loyalty would command the managers or governors of a nonprofit
Litigation express this same view: “Thus, a nonprofit’s unique accountability to the
public and to its donors imposes an additional duty of obedience that dictates how
each director exercises the duty of care and demonstrates loyalty to the
organization.” F. Brooks Cowan et. al, Nonprofit Law and Litigation, in 2 ANNUAL
REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LITIGATION 1453, § 23.2 at
1459 (2011). In the recently published third edition of Nonprofit Governance and
Management, the authors recognize that there is disagreement whether a duty of
obedience separate from other duties exists but state, “In either case, adherence to
or support of the organization’s mission is a fundamental expectation of nonprofit
directors.” NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 11 (Cheryl Sorokin et al.
eds, 3d ed. 2011).
141. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593
(App. Div. 1999) (citation omitted).
142. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 202.
143. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 116, § 300 cmt. g
(3). The comment addresses the requirement of good faith in the exercise of the
duties of loyalty and care, and it provides:
As part of their duties of loyalty and care, board members may not
knowingly cause or permit the charity to violate the law or the charity’s
organizational documents and policies. . . . Moreover, the board must
take reasonable steps to ensure that management is legally and ethically
compliant and that management has established internal controls that
permit the board to determine compliance . . . and to remedy
wrongdoing by management . . . .
Some commentators place the obligation to obey the law and the
organizational documents and policies under a third duty unique to
charity fiduciaries—the “duty of obedience.” Substantively, to these
commentators, such a duty embraces a faithfulness to the purposes of the
charity. These Principles, however, do not employ the terminology of a
duty of obedience. While the members of the governing board must
adhere to the organizational documents, they also have the obligation to
keep the purpose of the charity current and useful. Accordingly, the
board must amend the stated purposes when necessary and appropriate
to do so, in accordance with the law and the existing organizational
documents.
Id.
144. Id.
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limited liability company to further the exempt and charitable
purposes of the organization and comply with state law governing
the organization and federal tax law providing the exemption for
which the nonprofit was seeking to qualify. For a nonprofit limited
liability company formed under state law not specifically providing
for a nonprofit LLC, that creates a problem. It would be easy
enough to include in the articles and operating agreement the
required, standard provisions attesting that the organization was
organized exclusively and would exclusively be operated for
exempt purposes, and that on dissolution its assets would be
distributed to further the same or similar exempt purposes, or to
another exempt organization, or to government. But even if these
provisions are included in the organizational documents—the
articles or certificate and the operating agreement—the question
is, as the IRS expressed it in its Limited Liability Company Reference
Guide Sheet, can the LLC represent “that all of its organizing
document provisions are consistent with state LLC laws, and are
145
enforceable at law and in equity?”
D. State LLC Laws and the Requirements for a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit
Organization
The language of § 501(c)(3) is unqualified and clear, and it is
axiomatic that “no part of the net earnings [may] . . . inure[] to the
146
It is the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”
practice to include such a provision in the articles of organization
of a nonprofit seeking to qualify under § 501(c)(3), and an
organization would fail the operational test if any part of its
earnings are distributed to a private shareholder or individual.
Moreover, “An organization is not organized exclusively for one or
more exempt purposes unless its assets are dedicated to an exempt
purpose,” and it will also fail the organizational test “if its articles or
the law of the State in which it was created provide that its assets
would, upon dissolution, be distributed to its members or
147
Thus, it is standard practice, and the IRS, in its
shareholders.”
instructions to organizations completing Form 1023 and applying
for recognition as a tax-exempt organization, counsels to include
145.
86.
146.
147.

See GUIDE SHEET, supra note 48, at 2; supra text accompanying notes 84–
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (2011).
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an acceptable “dissolution clause” in the articles or certificate of
organization, providing that upon dissolution the assets of the
organization will be distributed for one or more exempt purposes,
or to one or more organizations that are 501(c)(3) organizations,
or to state or local government.
The laws governing organizations under which those forming
a charitable nonprofit historically have proceeded are consistent
with these requirements of § 501(c)(3).
State nonprofit
corporation laws, such as the MNCA, contain provisions that
proscribe both distribution of earnings to private individuals and
transfer of the assets of the organization upon dissolution to a
purpose or organization other than one that would meet the
148
The Revised Uniform
requirements of § 501(c)(3).
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (“RUUNAA”) is to the
same effect. It prohibits an unincorporated nonprofit association
from paying dividends or making distributions to a member or
manager, and it provides that property neither needed for payment
of debts nor subject to other instructions from the donor or in a
trust document “be distributed . . . as required by law other than
this [act] that requires assets of an association to be distributed to
149
With the
another person with similar nonprofit purposes.”
doctrine of cy pres, trust law is the same. Where it “becomes
unlawful, impossible, or impracticable to carry out” the designated
charitable purpose, or where it would be “wasteful to apply all of
the property to the designated purpose,” a court is directed to
apply “the property or appropriate portion thereof to a charitable
150
purpose that reasonably approximates the designated purpose.”
Four states have adopted nonprofit limited liability company
151
acts that contain the required provisions and thus the LLC
should be available for nonprofit organizations in those states no
less than the nonprofit corporation, charitable trust, or
unincorporated nonprofit association. The acts address the
organizational and operational tests the IRS has articulated, and in
152
fact these statutes reflect the IRS Reference Guide Sheet instructions.
148. MNCA §§ 6.40(a), 14.05 (2008).
149. RUUNAA §§ 26, 29 (2008).
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
151. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.015(18)–(19), 275.025, 275.520, 275.530,
275.535, 275.540 (2011); MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.03 subdiv. 31a, 322B.975 (2011);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-36-01 to -09 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-702 to -704
(2011).
152. See GUIDE SHEET INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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The North Dakota Nonprofit Limited Liability Company Act states
flatly, “An individual may not be a member of, or own any financial
rights or governance rights in, a nonprofit limited liability
153
In a similar vein, the Kentucky Nonprofit Limited
company.”
Liability Companies Act provides, “A nonprofit limited liability
company shall not have or issue membership interests in the
limited liability company, and no distribution shall be paid, and no
part of the income or profit of the limited liability company shall
154
The Tennessee
be distributed to its members or managers.”
Nonprofit Limited Liability Companies Act envisions and is limited
to the situation of a single-member nonprofit LLC where the sole
155
Minnesota incorporates
member is a nonprofit corporation.
formation of a nonprofit LLC into its general limited liability
company act and has a separate section stating the non-distribution
constraint and limitation on distribution of assets on dissolution,
and incorporating provisions that would apply to a nonprofit
156
corporation (e.g., provisions addressing conflicts of interest).
Most states, however, have not adopted separate acts or
153. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-36-05. It does not, however, limit membership
to 501(c)(3) organizations or governmental entities or units, as the Instructions
do. See GUIDE SHEET INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 47, at 3. One or more 501(c)(3)
organizations could utilize the statute to form a tax-exempt nonprofit LLC, and
non-501(c)(3) organizations could presumably utilize the statute to form an LLC
that would seek exempt status under a provision of § 501(c) other than (c)(3).
Organizers have formed eight nonprofit LLCs under the North Dakota Nonprofit
LLC Act. E-mail from Clara M. Jenkins, Dir., Bus. Sys. & Programs, Office of N.D.
Sec’y of State, to author (Aug. 16, 2011) (on file with author).
154. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.520(1). In truth, this seems to be an anomalous
provision because the Act otherwise defines a limited liability company as one
“formed under this chapter having one (1) or more members.” Id. § 275.015(11).
Nonetheless, the Office of the Kentucky Secretary of State reports that 303
nonprofit LLCs have been formed in Kentucky. E-mail from J. Allen Eskridge, III,
Ky. Assistant Sec’y of State, to Tom E. Rutledge, Member, Stoll Keenon Ogden
PLLC (Aug. 8, 2011) (on file with author).
155. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-702(3), 48-101-704. The Tennessee Act
authorizes an existing nonprofit corporation to form a nonprofit limited liability
company “[w]hose sole member is a nonprofit corporation” and which therefore
will be “disregarded as an entity for federal income tax purposes.” Id. § 48-101702(3). An LLC that is a disregarded entity under the “check-the-box” regulations
does not need to file a Form 1023 and seek recognition as a tax-exempt entity. See
supra text accompanying notes 44–48. At the same time, the LLC would be a
separate entity for liability purposes and would thus shield the parent from
liabilities arising out of activities of the LLC or its ownership of property. Id. See
generally James M. McCarten & Kevin N. Perkey, Tennessee Nonprofit LLCs—A New
Option for Tax-Exempt Organizations, 3 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 15 (2001)
(discussing the nonprofit LLC option available to tax-exempt organizations).
156. MINN. STAT. § 322B.975 (2011).
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provisions concerning nonprofit LLCs and instead have provisions
157
Specifically, RULLCA envisions
like those found in RULLCA.
individuals as members who make contributions that are not
dedicated to exempt purposes, and who have management rights
158
159
Other than insolvency,
giving them control over those assets.
there is no constraint on distributions to members, and instead
RULLCA explicitly authorizes the making of distributions of
160
earnings or assets to members before dissolution of the LLC.
Nor does RULLCA contain language requiring distribution of
assets on dissolution to a 501(c)(3) organization or otherwise for
exempt purposes in the event the LLC was formed as a nonprofit.
Instead, like other state LLC statutes, RULLCA provides for
distribution of assets to the members after obligations to
creditors—including
members
who
are
creditors—are
161
State LLC statutes, therefore, do not contain the
discharged.
protections for charitable assets that are found in nonprofit
corporation statutes, the RUUNAA, trust law, or state nonprofit
limited liability company acts as discussed above. It would seem too
plain for words that LLCs formed under these state statutes would
fail the “organizational test” and the “operational test” of §
501(c)(3).
Yet the LLC remains “a creature of contract,” and RULLCA’s
provisions on distributions—either during the conduct of the
LLC’s business and affairs or upon dissolution—are in fact default
162
Accordingly, there
provisions that may be varied by agreement.
is nothing in state law that would preclude persons forming a
nonprofit LLC from varying these default provisions and
incorporating in both the articles of organization and the
157. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 29-801 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-101 (2011);
IOWA CODE § 489.101 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-101 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §
48-3-101 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-101 (2011).
158. See RULLCA §§ 401–02, 407 (2006).
159. Id. § 405.
160. Id. § 404. RULLCA does not have a provision on allocation of profits and
losses, but other states do. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-503 (2011).
161. RULLCA § 708; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804.
162. RULLCA §§ 110, 404, 708. Section 110 provides that the operating
agreement governs the relations among the members and between the members
and the LLC and also the activities of the company and the conduct of those
activities. Id. § 110 (a)(1)–(3). The Act only governs “[t]o the extent the
operating agreement does not otherwise provide for a matter.” Id. § 110 (b).
Moreover, while the Act states certain provisions that the operating agreement
may not vary, none of the mentioned provisions in the text are among them. See
id. § 110 (c)(1)–(11).
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operating agreement standard provisions of the sort that a
practitioner would unfailingly include in the articles and bylaws of
a nonprofit corporation in preparation for seeking recognition as a
tax-exempt nonprofit organization and that are in fact generally
provided for by statute. Thus, arguably the articles and operating
agreement of the nonprofit LLC would satisfy the organizational
test, and assuming compliance with the articles and the operating
agreement, the operational test should be met, too.
Would the organizational documents be “consistent with state
LLC laws,” however, and be “enforceable in law and equity,” as the
163
IRS has instructed that applicants should be able to show? Since
the provisions in the statute regarding distributions of earnings and
assets and control over assets are default provisions that may be
varied and thus displaced in the articles and operating agreement,
they would seem to be consistent with state law in the sense that
164
But would the provisions
state law is not contravened by them.
precluding distribution of earnings to members or private
individuals and dictating distribution of assets on dissolution to taxexempt purposes or organizations be enforceable? What would
prevent the governing board from amending the organizational
165
documents, as LLC legislation allows, to become a for-profit
entity and secure the earnings and assets for themselves?
One response is that the governing board members owe a duty
of loyalty to the nonprofit limited liability company, including for
this purpose surely a duty of obedience to the purposes articulated
in organizational documents—and if not to the specific purposes
166
articulated in the original documents perhaps years ago —then at
least to tax-exempt purposes and the preservation of the company’s
qualification as a tax-exempt organization. One question to be
167
asked is, who would enforce that duty? Is there a way to prohibit
163. See GUIDE SHEET INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 47; see supra text accompanying
note 50 (specifically, the twelfth condition).
164. See RULLCA § 708 (b)–(d) cmt. (stating that the provisions provide
“default rules” although they are subject to the provisions on “charging orders”);
id. § 503 (explaining and defining “charging orders”).
165. See id. §§ 110(a)(4), 407(b)(5), (c)(4)(D).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 139–43.
167. The problem of who will enforce this duty is a question that needs to be
addressed, because neither donors, nor beneficiaries, nor members of the
community or the public have standing to sue for breach of governing board
members’ duties in regard to charitable assets. See infra Part III.E.; FISHMAN &
SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 238 (“The general rule . . . remains that, absent a
statutory right, there is no private enforcement of a charitable trust, a nonprofit
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amendment of the organizational documents, at least in this
fashion, without notice to state authorities and the opportunity to
168
It requires that anyone seeking
resist? Kentucky does just that.
to amend the articles to eliminate nonprofit status and nonprofit
purpose give ten days’ notice to the Attorney General; given notice,
the Attorney General could seek injunctive relief to ensure
169
protection of charitable assets. Most states, however, do not have
170
A second response would
such a provision in their LLC statutes.
come from the IRS itself. Any such change in the articles and
operating agreement eliminating nonprofit purpose would be
171
Yet
cause for revocation of tax-exempt status, even retroactively.
that would not preclude the governing board from doing so under
state law, and circumstances in which it would be worth the while of
172
the governing board members are readily imaginable.
Still another possibility would be for the articles of
organization and the operating agreement to contain a clause
precluding them from being amended to eliminate the nonprofit
purpose of the company without notice to or the approval of a
third person, for example, the Attorney General or the appropriate
court. That seems to be the intended effect of the Kentucky
provision. Similarly, while some states’ nonprofit corporation laws
do not require the board to give notice to the Attorney General or
seek court approval where the board seeks to amend the articles to
173
modify the nonprofit purpose, where the board proposes to take
trust, or a nonprofit corporation.”).
168. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(6) (2011) (“If the limited liability company
is a nonprofit limited liability company, then the articles of organization shall state
that fact and its nonprofit purpose. This provision of the articles of organization
shall not be removed from the articles of organization without written notice to
the Attorney General of Kentucky given not less than ten (10) business days prior
to the filing of the amendment.”). The same result would likely occur in
Minnesota. See MINN. STAT. §§ 317A.811, 317A.813, 322B.975(6) (2011).
169. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(6).
170. The states which have adopted nonprofit limited liability company
legislation have such provisions. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(6); MINN.
STAT. §§ 317A.811, 322B.975(6); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-36-06, 10-33-102 (2011);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-707 (2011). But they are the exception and not the
rule.
171. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200842047 (Oct. 17, 2008).
172. An example of such a situation would be where the amount that
individuals would have to pay as a result of retroactive revocation of tax-exempt
status and consequent imposition of personal taxes would be substantially less than
the profits they would earn and appreciation that might occur if they converted to
a for-profit entity, for example, in the health care field.
173. MNCA § 10.05 (2008). The position taken in the ALI’s Principles of the
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action that would eliminate the entity’s nonprofit purpose
174
altogether and convert it to a for-profit entity, notice to the
Attorney General and authorization from the appropriate court is
175
RULLCA offers a solution along the lines
generally required.
suggested by the Kentucky Nonprofit LLC Act and state nonprofit
corporation law. It authorizes the operating agreement to “specify
that its amendment requires the approval of a person that is not a
party to the operating agreement or the satisfaction of a
176
which could be the Attorney General or the
condition,”
appropriate court. It could be argued that giving “approval”
authority for such an amendment to the Attorney General would
inappropriately make the Attorney General “a ‘super’ member of
177
Oversight
the board,” which is not the Attorney General’s role.
and prevention of wrongdoing by nonprofits’ boards is the
Attorney General’s role. However, the issue here—whether or not
to approve amendment of the articles and operating agreement
essentially to authorize conversion of a 501(c)(3) nonprofit to a
for-profit entity, leading to distribution of earnings and diversion of
charitable assets in contravention of the nondistribution constraint
that identifies the entity as a nonprofit—is not simply one of
amending the LLC’s purposes to reflect evolution of a nonprofit
178
The issue is whether
purpose and its adaptation to the times.
assets dedicated to the public interest will remain so. That calls for
a provision placing amendment beyond the governing board’s
Law of Nonprofit Organizations is that notice to the Attorney General of amendment
to the articles is not required in the event the entity is a nonprofit corporation, but
is required if the entity is a charitable trust. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT
ORGS., supra note 26, §§ 230, 240.
174. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(6); MINN. STAT. §§ 317A.811,
322B.975; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-36-06, 10-33-102.
175. E.g., MNCA §§ 9.03(b), 9.30(a), (c). The Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act, still the law in many states, explicitly provided that prior approval
of the appropriate court was required, after a proceeding in which the Attorney
General had been given written notice, in the event of a merger of a public benefit
corporation with any entity other than another public benefit corporation.
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 11.02 (2002).
176. RULLCA § 112(a) (2006). Similarly, section 10.05 of the MNCA provides
that the board of directors may amend the articles of a nonmembership
corporation—which a 501(c)(3) nonprofit would be—but an amendment must
also be approved “by a designated body whose approval is required by the articles
of incorporation or bylaws.” MNCA § 10.05(1). This is the principle at work in
RULLCA § 112.
177. See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity
Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 938, 976 (2004).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 139–43.
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control and requiring review by the Attorney General and the
Attorney General’s approval, or a court’s. RULLCA section 112
would authorize that option.
If this option were pursued, persons seeking to form a
nonprofit LLC could include a provision in the articles and
operating agreement specifying that neither the articles nor the
operating agreement could be amended without the approval of
the Attorney General or the appropriate court. That kind of clause
should be enforceable and prevent amendment of the documents
and distribution of the LLC’s earnings and assets contrary to
501(c)(3) and the requirements of the IRS.
A problem would be that some Attorneys General might not
accept that role, and others might allocate or have available too few
179
More
resources to fulfill it meaningfully for the IRS’s purposes.
basically, however, even if the IRS could be persuaded through one
or more of these means that the organizational and operational
tests were satisfied, intervention of the Attorney General that is only
available when amendment of the articles or operating agreement
is sought would not provide the kind of oversight or protection of
charitable purpose and charitable assets in other contexts to assure
the IRS that tax-exempt purposes will not be compromised. What
protection of the nonprofit’s purposes and assets is available where
a nonprofit LLC may be formed under general limited liability
company legislation?
E. Do State LLC Acts Allowing Formation of a Nonprofit LLC Offer
Necessary Protection of Charitable Assets?
The assets of a charitable nonprofit organization are dedicated
to public use and for the benefit of the community. That is the

179. See Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate
Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U.L. REV.
701, 703 (2008). In a survey to the states asking, among other things, how many
attorneys were dedicated to charity oversight, if any, seventy-four percent of the
states responding reported that they had one or no full-time attorneys assigned to
nonprofit oversight (seventeen states reported none).
Garry W. Jenkins,
Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV.
1113, 1128–29 tbl.1 (2007). On the willingness of Attorneys General to accept
regulatory roles, “an investigation by the staff of the Pennsylvania Assembly into
the spectacular collapse of the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy found that
the failings of the Attorney General’s office were not so much the fault of
inadequate staffing as deference to a well-connected, charismatic founder.”
Brody, supra note 177, at 949.
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180

very purpose of the nondistribution constraint under state law
and the requirement in § 501(c)(3): “no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual.” That is why the IRS insists upon a dissolution clause in
the articles of organization, without which the application for
recognition as a tax-exempt organization will be denied because it
181
A nonprofit organization will fail
will fail the organizational test.
the organizational and operational tests “unless it serves a public
182
In short, these are organizations
rather than a private interest.”
intended to benefit the public.
The public therefore has a strong interest in the assets of a
nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization being effectively devoted to the
organization’s exempt purposes, and not diverted, misapplied, or
wasted. That is certainly true where the nonprofit receives gifts or
grants from donors who contribute or make grants or buy services
from nonprofits with an expectation that revenues generated will
be devoted to exempt purposes and not misappropriated or
diverted. Accordingly, accountability of those governing the
nonprofit, enforcement of their duties, and protection of
charitable assets are matters of real importance. No individual
member of the community or the public, however, nor even a
donor or beneficiary, generally has standing to sue to prevent
183
breach or to enforce duties and obtain a remedy for breach. Yet,
there must be some means by which to protect against breach of
184
fiduciary duties.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 15–18.
181. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); I.R.S. FORM 1023, supra note 53, at Part III.
182. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2011).
183. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 231–38. There are limited
exceptions, but “[t]he general rule . . . remains that, absent a statutory right, there
is no private enforcement of a charitable trust, a nonprofit trust, or a nonprofit
corporation.” Id. at 238.
184. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 160 (2010),
where, in commenting upon the possibility of no-owner and nonprofit firms,
including nonprofit LLCs, the author states, “Without economic owners who have
incentives to protect their interests in profits, the firm also would need devices to
protect donors from misconduct by managers. That is why nonprofit corporations
have to form under special statutory provisions and are subject to special state
supervision.” See also REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT introductory cmt., at
xxvi–xxvii (1987):
Since members of public benefit corporations have no economic
interest in their corporations, they have no personal economic incentive
to monitor corporate activities and prevent abuses. Many public benefit
corporations do not even have members. While contributors have an
incentive to monitor corporate activities, they may have no practical
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It is the state Attorney General to whom state law generally
185
assigns the responsibility for oversight of nonprofit organizations.
Thirty-seven states provide by statute for the Attorney General to
186
The specific
have oversight responsibility for charitable assets.
powers vested in the Attorney General vary but typically require
that notice be given to the Attorney General of certain critical
events, especially ones such as dissolution or the transfer of all or
187
substantially all assets, and in many cases amendment of the
188
The
organization’s purposes where property is held in trust.
Attorney General may sue for injunctive relief and to remove
directors or trustees who have violated their duties of care or
189
While the principle of oversight responsibility and
loyalty.
authority of the Attorney General has historically been expressed in
nonprofit corporation statutes, in those states that have specifically
authorized nonprofit limited liability companies, the legislation has
given the Attorney General the same authority with respect to LLCs
190
As Evelyn Brody,
as is authorized for nonprofit corporations.
Reporter for the ALI’s project on Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
Organizations has expressed it, the Attorney General’s role is not
decision making but is “to provide oversight of the charitable
sector,” “to guard against charity fiduciaries’ wrongdoing,” and “to
seek to correct breaches of fiduciary duty that have not otherwise
191
For the IRS, which counts on
been remedied by the board.”
continuing satisfaction of the organizational and operational tests
and enforcement of organizational documents, and the state law
192
the
with which those documents must be consistent,
accountability provided by the Attorney General has to be regarded
means of doing so. . . .
The Revised Act . . . [filled] this void by statutorily clarifying existing
common law and statutory authority of the attorney general.
185. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 301–
06 (2004).
186. Id. at 306.
187. E.g., MNCA §§ 12.03(a)–(b), 14.05(c)–(d) (2008).
188. MNCA § 10.09.
189. E.g., MNCA § 1.51; MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.975 subdiv. 6, 317A.811–.813
(2011); Committee to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos, available at, https://folio
.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/502/THE%20COMMITTEE%20TO%20SA
VE%20ADELPHI.pdf?sequence=1 (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
190. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.025(6), 275.540 (2011); MINN. STAT. §
322B.975 subdiv. 6 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-36-06 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-101-705(d) (2011).
191. See Brody, supra note 177, at 1034.
192. See supra notes 56–57, 84–86 and accompanying text.
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as essential to tax-exempt status of the nonprofit organization.
Most state statutes that would allow a limited liability company
to be formed for any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for
profit, do not contain provisions giving the Attorney General the
authority that the Attorney General has with respect to nonprofit
corporations. RULLCA contains none, for the decision was made
early in the revision process to leave protective provisions to other
law. That appears to be one reason why Nebraska, which adopted
RULLCA, struck the language “regardless of whether for profit,”
leaving section 104(b) to say only that a limited liability company
193
could be formed for “any lawful purpose.”
Assuming that the IRS would otherwise be willing to move
beyond the position it stated in its Limited Liability Company Reference
Guide Sheet and allow individuals to form a tax-exempt nonprofit
LLC much as they could form a nonprofit corporation, is this
absence of protective provisions likely to be fatal to recognition as
tax-exempt? In truth, the absence of such provisions is not limited
to RULLCA and like LLC legislation. The most recent edition of
the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act does not require, and
instead leaves optional, provisions relating to the role of the
Attorney General:
The decision of the drafting committee to mark as
optional the provisions relating to the role of the attorney
general was based on the fact that charitable
organizations may not necessarily be structured as a
corporation, with the result that supervisory provisions for
them might be inadvertently omitted from a state’s
statutory scheme.
Charities may be organized as
unincorporated nonprofit associations or, under the law
of some states, as limited liability companies, and to cover
some other forms of entities requires a statute with
194
broader scope.
The choice to bracket and thus make optional the provisions
relating to the Attorney General has been prominently criticized,
for example, for failing to appreciate the significance of adhering
195
Moreover,
to state law to be in compliance with federal tax law.
193. E-mail from Julie Karavas, Chair of the Neb. Bar Ass’n Bus. Law Section,
to the author (on file with author).
194. MNCA Foreword, at xxiii (2008).
195. Evelyn Brody & Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Draft Model Nonprofit Act
Revision Needs Coordination with Tax Code, 119 TAX NOTES 617 (2008).
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while some states do permit nonprofit limited liability companies to
be formed under their LLC acts, some of those states specifically
incorporate by reference into their LLC legislation provisions
regarding the role of the Attorney General found in the nonprofit
corporation statutes; and for those that do not, they only raise the
question whether the state law provides an adequate framework on
which recognition of the organization formed under that law as
tax-exempt can rest. Yet it is in fact true that unincorporated
nonprofit association statutes have not articulated a role for the
196
Attorney General, and it should also be noted that not all states’
nonprofit corporation statutes articulate a role for the Attorney
197
“[T]o cover some other forms of
General as described above.
entities,” as the Foreword to the third edition of the MNCA quoted
above candidly states, there should be “a statute with broader
198
scope.”
The Uniform Laws Commission completed work on and
approved such a law in the summer of 2011. It is the Model
199
While extended discussion
Protection of Charitable Assets Act.
and analysis of this Act is beyond the scope of this article, it is
relevant that the Act is addressed to the protection of charitable
200
assets held by a person, regardless of the form of entity, so that it
would apply where charitable assets were held by a nonprofit
196. Neither the Uniform Laws Commission’s Uniform Unincorporated
Nonprofit Association Act—adopted in twelve jurisdictions—nor its Revised
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act—adopted in four jurisdictions (two of
which adopted the 1996 Act)—includes a provision stating the Attorney General’s
role with respect to the nonprofit. See RUUNAA (2008); UNIF. UNINCORPORATED
NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT (1994).
197. Iowa’s nonprofit corporation statute was amended in 2004 to address
mergers of a nonprofit corporation with or into any one or more business
corporations or nonprofit corporations or limited liability companies. IOWA CODE
§ 504.1101(1) (2011). Prior approval of the district court is required if a public
benefit corporation will merge with an entity other than a public benefit
corporation, IOWA CODE § 490.1102–1103, but Iowa law does not provide for
notice to, or a role for, the Attorney General. The Iowa Attorney General may,
however, have authority to intervene. See id. § 13.2(b) (authorizing Attorney
General to prosecute and defend in any court or tribunal “in which the state may
be a party or interested, when, in the attorney general’s judgment, the interest of the state
requires such action” (emphasis added)).
198. MNCA Foreword, at xxiii.
199. MODEL PROT. OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT (2011). The author was a
member of the Drafting Committee for this Model Act.
200. Id. § 2(1)–(2); MODEL PROT. OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT Prefatory Note
(2011) (Annual Meeting Draft approved by the ULC but not yet finalized) (on file
with the author).
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corporation; a charitable trust; an unincorporated nonprofit
association; a limited liability company; or, for that matter, a forprofit corporation if the assets held were indeed “charitable assets.”
In addition, the Act explicitly states, “The [Attorney General] shall
represent the public interest in the protection of charitable assets,”
and it provides the Attorney General with authority to seek to
prevent or to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty that would result
or have resulted in diversion, misapplication, or waste of charitable
201
assets. It would fill the gap noted above in RULLCA and in other
state laws under which a nonprofit organization might be
organized. Thus, if a nonprofit LLC were to be organized in a state
which adopted legislation like the Model Protection of Charitable
Assets Act, the reservation or objection that the state LLC law lacks
necessary protection for charitable assets would be answered, and a
remaining obstacle to recognition of the LLC as a tax-exempt
organization would be overcome.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nonprofit limited liability companies are presently being
organized and serve important purposes in the nonprofit world as
joint ventures involving a 501(c)(3) organization and as
subsidiaries where the LLC’s sole member is a nonprofit, 501(c)(3)
202
organization. Its use as a single member LLC formed by a parent
501(c)(3) particularly offers advantages in that the LLC is a
disregarded entity and does not have to file its own Form 1023 or
203
Form 990, yet limits the exposure of the parent to liability.
Beyond these contexts, use of the LLC to secure recognition as
a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization is presently not a realistic
204
The evolution of the LLC
choice under most states’ LLC laws.
suggests that will change. A strong source of the LLC’s appeal,
whether it is a nonprofit entity or a for-profit entity, is its flexibility
and the tailoring that is possible because it is a creature of
205
That “inherent plasticity,” as one author has described
contract.
it, is the LLC’s single theory that explains its flexibility and its
evolving adaptability to situations beyond those originally

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

MODEL PROT. OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 3(a)(2)–(3) (2011).
See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
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206

conceived for it.
Organizers are better able to structure their
arrangement and operate to further their mission and reach goals.
This flexibility and adaptability would make the limited liability
company a very valuable choice of form for numerous small- to
medium-sized 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations if state and
federal law recognized it as such. Nearly seventy-five percent of
reporting 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations—representing more
than 250,000 public charities—have budgets of less than $500,000 a
207
year.
As a practical matter, however, the IRS appears to limit the use
of LLCs to situations where one or more members is a 501(c)(3)
208
organization and none of the members is an individual.
Challenging the IRS on this point may not be worth the expense,
time, and effort that would be entailed, especially because the
nonprofit corporation is a readily available choice whose
requirements, formalities, and procedures conform to regulatory
requirements—not by accident, of course.
But the IRS’s position in this regard can be readily explained
on the basis of LLC law at the time it communicated its twelve
conditions and issued its Reference Guide Sheet and Instructions.
Historically, LLCs could only be formed for a business purpose; the
law provided for individual members who made contributions and
had contractual rights to share in profits, receive distributions,
control assets, and have assets distributed to them on dissolution
209
Nothing could be farther from the
after creditors were paid.
nondistribution constraint, prohibition of inurement and private
benefit, and requirement that assets on dissolution be transferred
only for public, exempt purposes, or to other 501(c)(3) entities, or
to government.
Yet limited liability company legislation has evolved since that
time, and the “inherent plasticity” with which it imbues the LLC
makes it possible to consider an LLC as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit
206. Thomas Earl Geu, A Single Theory of Limited Liability Companies: An
Evolutionary Analysis, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 507, 551 (2009).
207. Wing et al., supra note 5, at 3 fig.1. “Reporting” 501(c)(3) nonprofit
organizations are those that collected more than $25,000 in gross receipts and
filed a Form 990 with the IRS. According to this study by the Urban Institute’s
Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, there were more than 600,000 public
charities that were not reporting nonprofit organizations. In consequence, the
number of “small” 501(c)(3) organizations is far greater than the 250,000
reporting pubic charities. Id. at 2.
208. See supra note 49.
209. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
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organization. LLC laws increasingly allow an LLC to be organized
210
for any lawful purpose, “regardless of whether for profit.”
Management may be structured as members or organizers choose,
perhaps preferably as manager-managed with a “board of
managers,” but there must and will be a “governing body” that can
operate the LLC in compliance with federal tax law and state LLC
211
The fiduciary duties of managers of LLCs under state law
law.
could fully meet the demands of the IRS for good governance in
nonprofits.
That is not to say that there are not serious issues that need to
be addressed. The default provisions of almost all LLC statutes
assume that inurement and distribution of earnings and assets will
212
The distribution of earnings and assets to members as
occur.
owners is irreconcilable with 501(c)(3) and would have to be
213
They
addressed in the articles and in the operating agreement.
214
can be. LLC provisions in these respects are default provisions.
Moreover, since LLC legislation does not presently contain the
215
constraints imposed by nonprofit corporation law, some way
would have to be found to ensure that the governing board could
not simply amend these to circumvent the constraints. One way
that some states have selected is simply to adopt nonprofit LLC acts
216
Another way that this
that contain the necessary provisions.
article suggests is through provisions in the articles and the
operating agreement prohibiting amendment of either of them
without the approval of a third party acceptable to the IRS, for
217
example, the Attorney General. Similar provisions are lawful and
enforceable in other contexts and should be enforceable with
respect to LLCs if states were to adopt RULLCA or amend their
218
An
LLC acts to include a provision like RULLCA section 112.
additional, serious issue that impedes recognition of nonprofit
LLCs as tax-exempt is the absence of provisions regarding the
219
But that,
Attorney General’s role from most state LLC statutes.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146–47, 162–64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 151–56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 168–76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157–78 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.E.
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too, may be addressed. Four states have done so in separate
nonprofit limited liability company legislation, and certainly this
concern would be addressed if states adopted the Model Protection
220
of Charitable Assets Act.
Until the changes suggested above occur, other than in the
situations the IRS currently approves, the choice to organize a
nonprofit that can secure recognition as tax-exempt under §
501(c)(3) as an LLC is unlikely and will be an uphill battle
probably not worth pressing. Consideration of an LLC in other
than presently sanctioned contexts, however, reveals changes in the
law that some states have made and responsive structuring in
practice that can readily be accomplished. Doing so would bring
the structural and operational advantages of the LLC to the
nonprofit sector—a sector of dynamic growth—and that prospect
seems certain to cause further consideration of what needs to be
changed to bring about that result and why that change should
occur.

220.

See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text.
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